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Abstract
Category theory can be applied to mathematically model the semantics of cognitive neural systems. We discuss
semantics as a hierarchy of concepts, or symbolic descriptions of items sensed and represented in the connection
weights distributed throughout a neural network. The hierarchy expresses subconcept relationships, and in a
neural network it becomes represented incrementally through a Hebbian-like learning process. The categorical
semantic model described here explains the learning process as the derivation of colimits and limits in a concept
category. It explains the representation of the concept hierarchy in a neural network at each stage of learning
as a system of functors and natural transformations, expressing knowledge coherence across the regions of a
multi-regional network equipped with multiple sensors. The model yields design principles that constrain neural
network designs capable of the most important aspects of cognitive behavior.

Keywords
category, cognition, colimit, functor, limit, natural transformation, neural network, semantics

UNM Technical Report: EECE-TR-04-020

1
1.1

Introduction
Neural Network Semantics and Knowledge

The search for a deeper understanding of neural networks has led investigators to the notion that the distributed
pattern of connection weights formed within a network as a result of its processing of input patterns can be
explained in terms of human- understandable rules ([2], [3], [4], [7], [8], [9], [13], [20], [18], [25], [31], [37], [40],
[44], [45]). Often, the rules are regarded as knowledge made explicit by a symbolic-rule-extraction technique. The
knowledge typically has the form IF (input stimulus) THEN (output response), providing an explicit description
of the relationship between meaningful items in the input patterns and desired responses to those items. The
symbolic expressions in the rules are meant to describe significant items associated with the stimuli as well as
items expressed through the network responses. Some investigators have used mathematics to remove ambiguity
in the descriptions and to associate with rigor the relationship of rule expressions to connection weights. Typically,
they do this by expressing the rules as symbolic formulas in a formal logic. This use of symbolic statements to
model the knowledge content of a computational system is called mathematical semantics[39].
The original inspiration for neural networks is the highly interconnected, massively parallel, distributed, adaptive neuron-and-synapse structure of the brain. In contemporary modeling, the neurons and other architectural
elements are organized on a larger scale in a system of interconnected functional regions([11], [27]). Each region
is associated with one or more sensory modalities, motor control, planning, the control of working memory ([38],
[41], [47], [52]), and possibly self-referential processing, at least in humans[32]. The unique functionality of each
region can be described by a system of knowledge with which it has been associated. Neuroscientists work to understand the content and organization of the knowledge systems by carefully analyzing activity in different brain
regions during the perfomance of tasks, and by studying the task performance deficits associated with damage
to different regions and/or their interconnections found in patients. In general, the knowledge asssociated with a
region exists as a system of interconnected partial descriptions of sensed items and events. A goal of neuroscience
is to be able to use these partial descriptions in different combinations to explain the brain’s activity in response
to a given situation. For example, visual processing regions in the primate brain contain representations of visual
objects in terms of basic features of color, form and texture. Descriptions of visual objects, their form, color and
other features, and the relationships between objects and features constitute a knowledge system. Region-specific
knowledge representations act together through interconnections between regions to produce a response to each
input [43] and, in the brains of some animals, cognitive behavior([11], [15], [46], [26], [43], [29], [27], [48]).
For example, visual and auditory representations are unified in an association region that shares interconnections
with the vision- and sound-specific processing regions.
This paper addresses the question of where and how knowledge is stored in connectionist systems organized
to greater or lesser extent like the brains of various organisms. It presents a mathematical model of knowledge
as acquired by and stored within multi-region neural networks. Because it directly addresses the knowledge
represented in the adaptive structure of a neural network, the model is called a semantic model. As such, it is
consistent with previous work in logical rule modeling, but transcends rule-modeling by explaining the structure
of the knowledge contained in the rules and the component statements that form the rules. That is, the model
explains not only what the rules are saying, but how the rules arise from a hierarchical system of concepts,
with the hierarchy directed from the abstract to the specific. It explains this process as an incremental re-use
of existing concept representations in the neural network to form new concept representations as the network
processes input patterns. The model provides a mathematically rigorous yet natural explanation of the combining
of the interacting regional knowledge structures so that the network, if well-designed, acts as if there were a single
knowledge structure guiding its behavior. This is a key property studied with the model which we call knowledge
coherence.
The intended scope of the semantic model is the full range of neural network architectures, artificial or biological, from single-layer perceptrons to highly complex, multi-regional, mutli-sensor networks with recurrent
connections. The semantic model provides an analytical framework for understanding the capability of any neural
network design in terms of the knowledge it is capable of acquiring from its input data. It provides an analysis
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vehicle for the systematic design of neural networks having a desired knowledge-acquisition capability. Its use in
analysis and design can lead to a fundamental understanding of neural networks and a quantum jump in the state
of the art of biological neural system analysis and artificial neural network design.
The mathematical semantic model is based upon category theory. Category theory, the mathematical theory
of structure, is seeing increasing use in representing the hierarchical structure of knowledge and its manifestations
in computational structures—thus achieving a mathematical model of their semantics ([10], [12], [16], [28], [36],
[39], [49], [50], [51], [53]). This approach is now being applied to investigate the acquisition of knowledge
through adaptation in neural networks, and in this paper we describe the theoretical basis for this investigation.
Previous papers ([17],[19],[21], [22], [23]) have presented much of the theory in a preliminary form along with
an initial application to architectural design.
The paper is organized as follows. Since a grounding in category theory is as yet uncommon, Section 2
provides a brief review. Along with this, it introduces the fundamental categorical quantities used in semantic
analysis. Section 3 introduces categories of concepts and their instances, borrowing heavily from categorical
logic and model theory. Section 4 introduces the categories used in modeling neural architectural structure, and
Section 5 describes the association of concept categories with neural categories. Section 6 contains a discussion
of the implications for neural architecture design resulting from categorical constructions that model the learning
of specializations and abstractions derived from prior knowledge. Section 7 introduces information fusion across
multiple modalities as an interconnected system of concept hierarchy representations associated with network
sub-regions, and Section 8 presents an initial neural network design based upon this analysis. Section 9 contains
the final discussion and conclusion.

2
2.1

Category Theory: A Brief Introduction
A Mathematical Theory of Structure

A brief, straightforward introduction to category theory is contained in [39]. There are other good introductions
with varying mathematical detail, among them [1], [10], [33], and [34]. Category theory has been proposed as an
alternative to set theory as a foundation for mathematics; however, the two are normally used together, since each
has unique advantages in representing mathematical quantities in the most fundamental or abstract terms. The
primitive notion in set theory, in terms of which all others are defined, is that of the membership of a quantitiy x
in a collection y , denoted x ∈ y . in category theory, on the other hand, the primitive notion is that of an arrow,
or morphism—a relationship between two objects in a category. A category can be thought of as a system of
mathematical structures of some kind, concrete (such as algebras called groups) or abstract, and the relationships
(morphisms or arrows) between them that express that type of structure (in the cased of groups, the arrows are
the group homomorphisms). Each morphism f : a −→ b has a domain object a and a codomain object b ; that
is, f serves as a sort of directed relationship between a and b . In a category C , each pair of arrows f : a −→ b
and g : b −→ c (with a head-to-tail match, where the codomain b of f is also the domain of g as indicated) has
a composition arrow g ◦ f : a −→ c whose domain a is the domain of f and whose codomain c is the codomain
of g . Composition satisfies the associative law: In triples which have a head-to-tail match by pairs, f : a −→ b ,
g: b −→ c and h: c −→ d , the result of composition is order-independent, h ◦ (g ◦ f ) = (h ◦ g) ◦ f . Also, for
each object a , there is an identity morphism ida : a −→ a such that for any arrows f : a −→ b and g: c −→ a
ida ◦ g = g and f ◦ ida = f .
The principle of duality is a fundamental notion in category theory. The dual or opposite Cop of a category
C has the same objects, and the arrows reversed. The dual of a statement in category theory is the statement with
the words “domain” and “codomain” reversed and compositions f ◦ g in place of compositions g ◦ f (note that
the reversed arrows are by convention given the same names as the originals). If a statement is true of a category
C , then its dual is true of Cop ; if a statement is true of all categories, then, because every category is dual to
its dual, the dual statement is also true of all categories. This phenomenon means that, roughly speaking, “half
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3

the theorems of category theory are obtained for free”, since proving a theorem immediately yields its dual as an
additional theorem (see any of [1], [39], [34]).
Category theory provides a mathematically rigorous notion of “isomorphism”, a term which is often used in a
loose, intuitive sense in discourse. For example, in a discussion, one sometimes hears a statement such as “the two
[concepts, data types, program constructs, etc.] are in some sense isomorphic”. If we can formalize the entities
under discussion and include them in a category as objects, we can apply a more rigorous notion: If a, b are
objects of a category C such that there exist arrows f : a −→ b and g: b −→ a with f ◦ g = idb and g ◦ f = ida ,
then the morphism f is called an isomorphism (as is g also) and g is called its inverse (and f is called the
inverse of g ), and the two objects are said to be isomorphic. The property of an identity morphism ensures that
isomorphic objects in a category are interchangeable in the sense that they have the same relationships with all
objects of the category.
Certain notions in category theory are key to semantic modeling. One is the notion of an initial object in a
category and the dual notion of a terminal object. An initial object of a category C is an object i having a unique
morphism f : i −→ a corresponding to every object a of C . A terminal object t is the dual notion, obtained
by reversing arrows in the definition of i —that is, it serves as the codomain of a unique morphism f : a −→ t
corresponding to every object a of C . It is easy to show that all initial objects in a category are isomorphic, and
ditto for terminal objects in a category. For example, suppose that i, i0 are initial in C . Then, applying initiality
to each object, there must be unique morphisms f : i −→ i0 and f 0 : i0 −→ i . The compositions f 0 ◦ f : i −→ i and
f ◦ f 0 : i0 −→ i0 must be unique as well, implying that f 0 ◦ f = idi and f ◦ f 0 = idi0 .
There is a category Set whose objects are sets, whose morphisms are functions, and for which composition
is just the familiar composition of functions, with (g ◦ f )(x) = g( f (x)) for functions f : a −→ b and g: b −→ c ,
with x ∈ a and (g ◦ f )(x) ∈ c . Function composition is associative, and for any set X there is an identity function
idX whose values are idX (x) = x (x ∈ X) , so Set is indeed a category. The empty set, 0/ , is the single initial
object of Set, since for any set a there is a unique function f : 0/ −→ a whose domain is 0/ and whose codomain
is a , namely, the vacuous function, since there are no elements in 0/ to map to an element of a . There are an
infinite number of terminal objects in Set, namely the singletons {x} , since there is a single function f : a −→ {x}
mapping the elements of any set a to x . Finally, notice that a Set isomorphism is just a one-to-one, onto function.
A second example of a category dispels any notion that the morphisms must represent mappings. Consider the
category N+
| , in which the objects are nonzero natural numbers and in which there is a morphism |n,m : n −→ m
exactly when n is a divisor of m , n | m . Notice that the transitive property of the divisor relation yields a
composition operation, which is associative. Identities exist since every nonzero natural number divides itself,
n | n . In fact, natural numbers are the objects in more than one category. Consider the category N≤ , which has
all the natural numbers as objects and in which there is a morphism ≤n,m : n −→ m exactly when the inequality
n ≤ m holds. Again, the transitivity of the relation used to define the category, in this case ≤ , yields an associative
composition operation, and again identities exist, in this case since every nonzero natural number is related to
itself, n ≤ n .
A second fundamental notion in category theory is that of a commutative diagram. In Figure 1 , the diagram
∆ expresses the fact that 4 and 6 are both divisible by 2. Diagram ∆0 expresses also the additional knowledge that
24 is divisible by 4 and 6. The dashed arrow represents the consequential knowledge that (because 24 is divisible
by 4 and 6 while 4 and 6 are divisible by 2) 24 is divisible by 2. Notice that there are two morphisms from 2 to
24 that are compositions along a path directed through a third object (4 and 6, respectively), yet there is at most
one divisibility morphism from one natural number to another. Therefore, |4,24 ◦ |2,4 = |2,24 = |6,24 ◦ |2,6 . The
diagram ∆0 is said to be a commutative diagram.
A commutative diagram in any category has the property that any two morphisms having the same diagram
objects as domain and codomain, where at least one of them is obtained as the composition of two or more diagram
morphisms and the other is obtained in the same fashion or is itself a diagram morphism, are equal. In other
words, a commutative diagram is associated with a system of equations involving compositions of morphisms.
This expresses a system of constraints on mathematical structures associated with the category.
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Figure 1: Two diagrams in the category Nat| .
One of the most important uses of commutative diagrams and terminal and initial objects is in the definition
of a limit of a diagram and the dual type of quantity, a colimit. Colimits have long been used ([16], [28], [53]) in
categorical logic and computer science as a means of expressing complex formal logic theories or specifications
of theories in terms of their simpler, component theories or specifications. In a later section, we apply colimits
and limits to model the semantics of the Hebbian-like learning in a neural network, where the network learns by
adapting the synaptic connections strengths between neuron-like elements called nodes .

2.2

Colimits

Let ∆ be a diagram in a category C as shown in Figures 2 and 3 , with objects a1 , a2 , a3 , a4 , a5 and morphisms
f1 : a1 −→ a3 , f2 : a1 −→ a4 , f3 : a2 −→ a4 , f4 : a2 −→ a5 . The diagram ∆ in Figure 3 extends ∆ to a commutative
diagram with an additional object b and morphisms gi : ai −→ b (i = 1, . . . , 5) , provided additional objects and
morphisms with the requisite properties exist in C . That is, g1 ◦ f1 = g2 = g3 ◦ f2 and g3 ◦ f3 = g4 = g5 ◦ f4 .
The added cone-like structure K consisting of the apical object b and leg morphisms g1 , g2 , g3 , g4 , g5 is called a
cocone for diagram ∆ . In general, a diagram can have many cocones or it can have few or none, depending upon
the available objects and morphisms in C . Given cocones K 0 and K 00 for ∆ in Figure 2 , with respective apical
objects b0 , b00 and leg morphisms g0 i and g00 i (i = 1, . . . , 5) , a cocone morphism with domain K 0 and codomain
K 00 is a C -morphism h: b0 −→ b00 having the property
g00 i = h ◦ g0 i

(i = 1, . . . , 5) .

(1)

That is, h is a factor under composition of each leg morphism g00 i of K 00 with respect to the corresponding leg
morphism g0 i of K 0 . This is illustrated in Figure 2 . Re-using the symbol h for notational efficiency, we also
denote the cocone morphism determined by h as h: K 0 −→ K 00 .
With morphisms so defined, and composition of cocone morphisms following directly from composition of
C -morphisms, the cocones for ∆ form a category, coc∆ . A colimit for the diagram ∆ is an initial object K in the
category coc∆ . That is, for every other cocone K 0 for ∆ , there exists a unique cocone morphism h: K −→ K 0 .
The original diagram ∆ is called the base diagram for the colimit and the diagram ∆ formed by adjoining K
to ∆ is called its defining diagram. Note that, as all initial objects are isomorphic, all colimits for a given base
diagram are isomorphic.
A coproduct (Figure 4 ) is the colimit of a discrete diagram, one having objects but no morphisms among
them. In Set , for example, coproducts are disjoint unions of the component sets.
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Figure 2: A cocone morphism h: K 0 −→ K 00 in coc∆ is a morphism h: b0 −→ b00 in C between the apical
objects b0 and b00 of cocones K 0 and K 00 , respectively, that is a factor of each leg morphism g00 i : ai −→ b00
of K 00 , with g00 i = h ◦ g0 i .

2.3

Limits

Limits are the dual notion to colimits; that is, the one notion is obtained from the other by “reversing the arrows”
and interchanging “initial” and “terminal” (for objects). The reason for discussing colimits first is that they have
a history of use in categorical logic and computer science ([16], [53]) and, perhaps more importantly, colimits
for all diagrams exist in certain categories of interest to us—but limits do not exist for all diagrams in these
categories. The diagrams for which limits do exist are in that sense special, and we shall have more to say about
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Figure 3: A colimit for a diagram ∆ . The extended diagram ∆ extends ∆ with a conical structure of
morphisms from all diagram objects a1 , . . . , a5 pointing to an apical object b
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Figure 4: A coproduct, where the base diagram ∆ is discrete.
this when we discuss the concept hierarchy representation of neural network semantics.
Duality makes a discussion of limits quite simple, now that colimits have been defined. Our example will
have a correspondingly simple diagram. Let ∆ be a diagram in a category C as shown in Figure 5 , with
objects a1 , a2 , a3 and morphisms f1 : a1 −→ a3 , and f2 : a2 −→ a3 ,. The diagram ∆ extends ∆ to a commutative
diagram with an additional object b and morphisms gi : b −→ ai (i = 1, . . . , 3) , provided additional objects and
morphisms with the requisite properties exist in C . That is, f1 ◦ g1 = g3 = f2 ◦ g2 . The conical structure K
is called a cone; note that its morphisms are directed into the diagram, the opposite sense of the leg morphisms
of a cocone, which are directed out of the diagram. Cone morphisms are defined appropriately by analogy with
cocone morphisms, and again composition follows directly from composition of C -morphisms and the cones for
∆ form a category, cone∆ . A limit for the diagram ∆ is a terminal object K in the category cone∆ . That is,
for every other cone K 0 for ∆ , there exists a unique cone morphism h: K 0 −→ K . Again, the original diagram
∆ is called the base diagram for the limit and the diagram ∆ formed by adjoining K to ∆ is called its defining
diagram. Note that, as all terminal objects are isomorphic, all limits for a given base diagram are isomorphic.
A limit for a discrete diagram is called a product, and the leg morphisms are called projections. The familiar
cartesian product of sets is an example in the category Set .

2.4

Structural Mappings

The importance of category theory lies in its ability to formalize the notion that things that differ in substance can
have an underlying similarity of “structural” form. A house plan exists as a complex of forms either inscribed
in ink on paper or electronically within a computer. The plan can be implemented (mapped) many times, with
variations in the fine details of construction, to build houses. Each instance of building a house from the plan can
be thought of as a mapping from the structure detailed in the architectural plan to a structure made of wood, brick,
stone, metal, wallboard, and other materials. The material substances of the plan and the house are different but
the structure given in the plan is essentially unchanged in the constructed house. In category theory, the notion of
a structure-preserving mapping is formalized in the definition of a functor. A functor F : C −→ D , with domain
category C and codomain category D , associates to each object a of C a unique image object F(a) of D and
to each morphism f : a −→ b of C a unique morphism F( f ) : F(a) −→ F(b) of D . Moreover, F preserves the
compositional structure of C , as follows. Let ◦C and ◦D denote the separate composition operations in categories
C and D , respectively. For each composition g ◦C f defined for morphisms of C , F(g ◦C f ) = F(g) ◦D F( f ) , and
for each identity morphism of C , F(ida ) = idF(a) . It follows that F preserves the commutativity of diagrams,
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Figure 5: A limit for a diagram ∆ . The extended diagram ∆ extends ∆ with a conical structure of morphisms to all diagram objects a1 , . . . , a3 from an apical object b .
F(a)

αa

F( f )


F(b)

/ G(a)

G( f )

αb


/ G(b)

Figure 6: A commutative diagram associated with a natural transformation. The morphisms G( f ) ◦ αa :
F(a) −→ G(b) and αb ◦ F( f ) : F(a) −→ G(b) are one and the same, G( f ) ◦ αa = αb ◦ F( f ) .
that is, the images of the objects and morphisms in a commutative diagram of C form a commutative diagram in
D . This means that any structural constraints expressed in C are translated into D and, hence, F is a structurepreserving mapping.
The two categories N+
| and N≤ yield an example of this important kind of structural relation. Define a
+
functor F : N| −→ N≤ as follows. The image of each positive natural number n is itself, that is, F(n) = n . The
image of each morphism |n,m is the morphism F(|n,m ) , where F(|n,m : n −→ m) = ≤n,m : n −→ m , which works
because n | m implies n ≤ m . Notice that the compositional structure of N+
| is appropriately preserved.
Not only are there structure-preserving mappings between categories, but also structure-preserving relations
between the mappings themselves. A natural transformation α : F −→ G with domain functor F : C −→ D
and codomain functor G : C −→ D consists of a system of D -morphisms αa , one for each object a of C , such
that the diagram in D shown in Figure 6 commutes for each morphism f : a −→ b of C . That is, the morphisms
G( f ) ◦ αa : F(a) −→ G(b) and αb ◦ F( f ) : F(a) −→ G(b) are actually one and the same, G( f ) ◦ αa = αb ◦ F( f ) .
In a sense, the two functors have their morphism images F( f ): F(a) −→ F(b) , G( f ): G(a) −→ G(b) “stitched
together” by other morphisms αa , αb existing in D , indexed by the objects of C . Composition of the morphisms
along the two paths leading from one corner F(a) of a commutative square to the opposite corner G(b) yields
the same morphism, independently of the path traversed.
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Categorical Semantics
Concept Morphisms: The Structure of Knowledge

Few neural network researchers would argue with the notion that meaningful representations of the items that are
sensed to form input patterns for an adaptive network become associated with the connection weights through
Hebbian-like adaptation, or learning. That is how the network builds an ”internal model” leading to its ability
to perform a useful task associated with the input examples it has processed. That the many components of the
network are highly distributed and interdependent suggests that the represented items can be decomposed into
parts. For example, an item represented by an input pattern can be regarded as a combination of features that
stimulate individual input nodes to varying levels of activity. Symbolic descriptions for the parts or features of
input items can be associated with input patterns that express the features. Since the patterns are responsible for
the network activity that results in connection weight adaptation, it is conceivable that a system for manipulating
symbolic descriptions of items can be associated with the representation of input items in the distributed connection weight pattern of the network. This representation can be organized into a hierarchical system that relates
the more abstract items such as simple, pattern-expressed features to the more complex, more specific items that
are composed of the more abstract items. Categorical constructs involving a category of concepts and concept
relationships will be our system language for expressing the association of symbolic descriptions with adaptivelyformed, or learned, distributed representations of items.
A category Concept provides the hierarchical structure of descriptions associated with a distributed system
of item representations. Its objects are concepts, or symbolic descriptions of items, and its morphisms are concept
relationships. A concept morphism s: Ti −→ T j is an association of the description constituting concept Ti with a
subconcept, or logical part, of the description constituting concept T j . We use an already-available mathematical
convenience, a category of formal logic theories and theory morphisms[10], for the category Concept . An
example will serve to describe the objects and morphisms of this category, as well as provide a concrete example
of a colimit. The example is presented in full in the Appendix, and an overview of it is given in the next section
sufficient to follow its use as an illustration of the analysis of neural network semantics.

3.2

Example: Concepts, Morphisms and a Colimit

The definitions and axioms of a theory, as well as all formulas that can be proved from them, are symbolic
statements in a language sufficiently expressive and unambiguous that it can be used to phrase propositions for
proof by a mechanical theorem-prover. A theory describes a domain of items and their properties; a theory
of geometry is an example, where the items are geometric objects. A complete listing of the statements of a
theory includes the definitions of the quantities whose properties it describes, the axioms that assert the properties
assumed in the theory, all the quantities whose existence one can derive from the defined quantities, and all the
further properties of the quantities that one can prove from the axioms—that is, the theorems. It is not necessary
to always have in hand the entirety of a theory’s quantities and theorems. A simple alternative which we use
in most of our discussion is to list only its definitions and axioms. The inferred quantities can be derived and
theorems proved as they are needed. A theory can appear in several different forms, depending upon which of its
quantities and statements are regarded as definitions and axioms, for there are often many alternative choices. For
our formalization of concepts and their morphisms, we shall use the alternative of listing a single choice. Any
such list is called a formal specification. Even though specifications are not the same as theories, the distinction
will not be important for the purposes of this presentation.
We represent concepts as theories (or their specifications). A concept morphism is a theory morphism. The
following example illustrates concepts, concept morphisms, commutative diagrams and colimits. It shows how
the concept of a triangle can be derived from simpler concepts as the apical object of a colimit for a diagram.
The concepts and morphisms are expressed in a syntax similar to that used in [53]. For simplicity, a triangle is
regarded as a construct obtained by joining three distinct, intersecting lines (the angles often associated with a
triangle are not discussed). The example is only sketched here, but the Appendix contains a full exposition. The

Healy and Caudell—Category Theory ...

9

discussion in subsequent sections describes the association of the example colimit with the learning of complex
concepts and morphisms by a neural network through the re-use of prior conceptual knowledge.
Concept T1 is a very basic theory of points and lines. In this presentation, points are regarded as undefined
quantities and lines are quantities defined in terms of points. This is done through a logical predicate on that has
two arguments, a point and a line, and is true just in case the point is associated with (or “lies on”) the line. The
on predicate is used in an axiom to express the notion that any two distinct points are “on” some unique line (see
[5] for the use of this axiom in several different geometries).
Concept T1
sorts Points, Lines
const p1: Points
const p2: Points
const p3: Points
op on: Points*Lines -> Boolean
Axiom Two-points-define-a-line is
forall(x, y:Points) ((x not= y) implies
(exists l:Lines) (on (x, l) and on (y, l) and
((forall m:lines) (on (x, m) and on (y, m)) implies (m = l) ))
end
The statement line sorts Points, Lines introduces the most basic sorts of the concept T1 . Sorts are “logical containers” which are used to distinguish between the different types of things referred to by the variables
or constants in logical formulas. For example, the universal quantifier ( forall ) portion of the axiom in T1 ,
forall(x, y : Points) , makes it clear that the axiom is a formula applying to all things x and y of type “Points”.
As a consequence, the antecedent of the first implication of the axiom, (x not = y) , is understood to mean that
x and y represent two distinct points, as opposed to lines, circles, widgets, or any other kind of thing. The line op
on: Points*Lines -> Boolean specifies that there is an operation that maps any ordered pair (x, l) consisting of a point and a line to a member (“true” or “false”) of the Boolean sort. The meaning of on (x, l) is “Point
x lies on line l ”. An operation which takes values in Boolean is a called a predicate. The Boolean sort is part
of a concept of logical operations that is implicitly included in every concept (it is an initial object of the concept
category). Versions of formal logic containing predicates allow for highly expressive formulas, or statements,
that employ functions and quantifiers such as forall and exists , corresponding to the usual universal and existential quantifiers ∀ and ∃ , respectively. There are many derived sorts in a theory, such as products of the given
sorts. If the sort symbols represent sets, then product sorts represent cartesian products of the sets. For example,
the product sort Points ∗ Lines represents the set of ordered pairs (x, l) of points and lines. Combinations of
sorts and operations associated with them are similar to abstract data types in software specifications.
Notice that T1 also states the existence of three labelled, but otherwise unspecified, points p1, p2 and p3 .
This is done through the use of the statement form const X : Points , which is a way of stating that there exists
a specific (but otherwise indefinite) point with the label X . The three constants may or may not represent distinct
points: Their separate nature must either be stated as an axiom of T1 , or provable from the axioms of the concept.
We next express three concepts T2 , T3 and T4 by making and modifying three copies of T1 . In each new
concept, we add a line constant, re-name the three point constants (for clarity in this presentation—otherwise,
the specific names are not important), and associate two of the point constants with the line constant via the on
predicate. Notice the additional inclusion of an axiom stating that the three point constants denote distinct points.
A specification for the first of the three concepts, T2 , is as follows:
Concept T2
sorts Points, Lines
const pa1: Points
const pa2: Points
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const paext: Points
const la: Lines
op on: Points*Lines --> Boolean
Axiom Two-points-define-a-line is
forall(x, y:Points) ((x not= y) implies
(exists l:Lines) (on (x, l) and on (y, l) and
((forall m:lines) (on (x, m) and on (y, m)) implies (m = l) ))
on (pa1, la) and on (pa2, la) and (pa1 not= pa2)
end
The other two concepts are identical in form but differ in the naming of the point and line constants. They are
listed in full in the Appendix.
A concept morphism s1 : T1 −→ T2 maps the sort symbols Points and Lines to sort symbols in T2 . These
symbols are left unchanged by mapping Points to Points and similarly for lines, and also the on predicate.
All statements are reformulated in accordance with the symbol mapping to form their image statements in T2 .
The resulting mapping of formulas is truth-preserving: The single axiom of T1 relating points to lines maps to
itself as an axiom of T2 , and similarly for the implicit axioms for booleans. Finally, the point constants p1, p2
and p3 map to the point constants pa1, pa2 and paext , respectively. Here, pa1 and pa2 are associated with
the line la via the on predicate in T2 and paext is intended as a point “external to” la . This intention is not
stated in T2 because it is not necessary to make it explicit as yet. The individual symbol mapping relationships
are expressed using maplet notation:
Morphism s1 :

Points
Lines
on
p1
p2
p3

7→
7
→
7
→
7
→
7
→
7
→

Points
Lines
on
pa1
pa2
paext

Hereafter, all maplets that leave symbols unchanged will be omitted from morphism descriptions. Since every
sort and operation symbol must map to something, this will not result in any ambiguities.
Morphisms s2 : T1 −→ T3 and s3 : T1 −→ T4 have a similar form, but with different mappings of point constants
in place of those of s1 :
Morphism s2 :

Points
Lines
on
p1
p2
p3

7→
7
→
7
→
7
→
7
→
7
→

Points
Lines
on
pbext
pb1
pb2

Morphism s3 :

Points
Lines
on
p1
p2
p3

7→
7
→
7
→
7
→
7
→
7
→

Points
Lines
on
pc2
pcext
pc1
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The morphisms s2 and s3 indicate that the images of the point constants p1 , p2 and p3 are used differently
in T3 and T4 . In T3 , for example, it is the images pb1 of p2 and pb2 of p3 that are associated with the line
constant, lb , while the image pbext of p1 is the “external” point. This is so that the morphisms can properly
define the “concept blending” that forms a triangle from the three lines. This is accomplished by including exactly
the objects T1 , T2 , T3 , T4 and morphisms s1 , s2 , s3 in a diagram ∆ . A colimit for ∆ has the requisite cocone, as
shown in Figure 7 , with apical object T5 and leg morphisms `1 : T1 −→ T5 , `2 : T2 −→ T5 , `3 : T3 −→ T5 , and
`4 : T4 −→ T5 . With ∆ as the base diagram, the defining diagram of the colimit, ∆ as shown in the figure, is
commutative, with
`4 = `2 ◦ s1 = `3 ◦ s2 = `4 ◦ `3 .
(2)
Figure 8 is a pictorial illustration of the colimit defining diagram of Figure 7 . The illustration depicts the contents
of the concepts involved along with the diagram structure. The resulting colimit object, the specification T5 , is as
follows (see the Appendix for a complete exposition of the concepts and morphisms):
Concept T5
sorts Points, Lines
const p1: Points
const p2: Points
const p3: Points
const la: Lines
const lb: Lines
const lc: Lines
op on: Points*Lines -> Boolean
Axiom Two-points-define-a-line is
forall(x, y:Points) ((x not= y) implies
(exists l:Lines) (on (x, l) and on (y, l) and
((forall m:lines) (on (x, m) and on (y, m)) implies (m = l) ))
on (p1, la) and on (p2, la) and (p1 not= p2)
on (p2, lb) and on (p3, lb) and (p2 not= p3)
on (p3, lc) and on (p1, lc) and (p3 not= p1)
end
Spec T5 is a “blending” or “pasting together” of T2 , T3 and T4 along their common sub-concept T1 . This
is because of the commutativity of the defining diagram ∆ of the colimit. For the equality ( 2) to hold, separate
symbols of T2 , T3 and T4 that are images of the same symbol of T1 under the three diagram ∆ morphisms s1 , s2
and s3 must merge into a single symbol in the colimit apical concept T5 . To make this clear, we have re-assigned
the name of the common T1 symbol to the merged-image symbol in T5 for each such case. Thus, symbols such as
Points, Lines and on appear in T5 , and appear only once, since they are mapped to themselves by each of the
morphisms s1 , s2 and s3 . The point constants p1, p2, p3 also appear. However, in T5 , each one appears in the
definition of two different lines. This is because each of them appears in concept T1 but is mapped to three points,
one in each concept T2 , T3 , T4 , via the three morphisms from T1 to those concepts. In two of these concepts, its
image point appears in the definition of a line, but as a different point on a different line in each concept. In the
remaining concept, it appears as an “external” point, not on the line named in that concept. For example, p1 is
mapped to pa1 in T2 via s1 , to pbext in T3 via s2 , and to pc2 in T4 via s3 . In T5 , therefore, it forms the point
p1 at the intersections of lines la and lc , and lies external to line lb . See concept T5 , pictured in Figure 8 , for
an illustration of the triangle. The other concepts pictured in the defining diagram yield the names of the various
constants which together yield the vertices and sides of the triangle.
A theorem in category theory can be used to derive an algorithm for calculating colimits in any category that
contains colimits for all of its diagrams (the dual to The Limit Theorem—see [39]). The category Concept is
one such category. Thus, the apical object T5 and leg morphisms `1 , `2 , `3 , and `4 can be derived automatically
from the objects and morphisms of the base diagram, ∆ . This confers a great advantage on the use of category
theory in knowledge-based system development. Theories and their morphisms (or formal specifications and their
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Figure 7: A colimit for the diagram ∆ in the triangle geometry example in category Concept . The extended
diagram ∆ extends the point-and-line concepts in ∆ to form a concept about triangles formed from triples
of lines in the apical concept of the colimit, T5 , as discussed in the text.
morphisms) can be used to specify the intended semantics of software or other kinds of system components. The
colimit calculation and the structure-preserving mappings of category theory together provide a mathematically
rigorous as well as automated technique for constructing the full system from diagrams[53].
Here, we shall apply the same kind of mathematics, but regard the theories as concepts that describe the stimuli
that activate the nodes of a neural network, and the morphisms as relationships that describe the embedding of one
concept in another by virtue of the transmission of stimuli through paths of connections in a network. This will
provide an analytical framework for determining, unambiguously and precisely, when a neural architecture has the
capability to learn a hierarchy of concepts of varying degrees of complexity. It will also explicate the combining
of information from multiple sensors and the integration of cognitive functions such as memory storage and
retrieval, planning, and decision-making. It will make it possible to determine why a network generates the
input-to-output behaviors it does, and how to design a network with more desirable behavior.

3.3

Model Spaces

Each concept T has an associated space of instances. An instance can be thought of as a situation described
by T , where the entities and relationships of the situation satisfy the axioms of T . For example, an instance of
the colimit theory T5 just discussed consists of any geometrically-describable arrangement of entities satisfying
the theory axioms and in which the constants p1, p2, p3, la, lb, lc serve as labels for three distinct entities
considered to be points and three distinct entities considered as lines, each one at a specific location in some
“space”, real or imagined. Examples of these “spaces” include the Euclidean plane (imagined) and a collection
of pebbles on a sidewalk, arranged in intersecting straight lines so as to satisfy the theory axioms (real). A
consequence of the axioms of T5 that involve its point and line constants is that three lines labelled la, lb, lc
form a triangle with points labelled p1, p2, p3, at their intersections as specified. An instance of T1 is any
example of the geometry of points and lines, and an instance of any one of T2 , T3 or T4 is an example of geometry
augmented by a line defined by two points and a third point not specified as being on the line, with all quantities
labelled appropriately.
Instances of theories can be related, as the theories are related, by morphisms. The triangle example provides
an illustration. An instance of the geometry theory T5 , which describes a triangle axiomatically, consists of
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Δ

Figure 8: A pictorial illustration of the colimit base and defining diagrams ∆ and ∆ . The contents of the
concepts involved are pictured along with the diagrammatic structure. Solid dots and lines signify point
and line constants, respectively, labelled as in the corresponding concepts. Certain point constants are
equivalenced by the composition morphisms with domain T1 and codomain T5 , all of which are equal
since ∆ commutes. For example, pa1, pbext and pc2 are all mapped to the triangle vertex p1 in T5 by
the colimit leg morphisms `2 , `3 and `4 because p1 in T1 maps to pa1, pbext and pc2 via morphisms s1 ,
s2 and s3 , respectively. Concept T1 has no line constant, so it is shown containing a dashed line with two
open dots, representing the axiom relating points and lines which is present in all the concepts.
some mathematically-expressable means of organizing the space containing its entities— for example, points
and straight lines drawn on paper on the Euclidean plane or pebble arrangments on a sidewalk—together with a
triangle at a specific location and orientation to the observer with the vertices and sides labelled as are the point
and line constants. Each instance of T5 corresponds to an instance of T2 , T3 and T4 , which describe only points
and lines but provide partial information about the quantities and laws governing them which are necessary for
constructing triangles. Each instance of T2 , and also each instance of T3 and T4 , corresponds to an instance of
T1 . These relationships are composable: Each instance of T5 , by virtue of its correspondence with an instance
of any of T2 , T3 and T4 , corresponds to an instance of T1 as well. This shows that there are mappings from
instances of the more specific theories to instances of less specific theories embedded in them, and the mappings
have a law of composition. It is also true that the less specific theories can have more instances than those that
are more specific. This is because a theory is more specific when it has more sorts, operations, constants and/or
axioms, any of which provide constraints upon its instances.
This leads us to our system for analyzing the instances of concepts and relating them to neural network
activities. We denote the space of instances of a concept T , called models of T , by Mod(T ) . The mathematical
structure of a member σ of Mod(T ) is as follows. For each sort u of T , there is a set uσ . For each operation
p of T , where p is given the form p: u −→ u0 , there is a function pσ : uσ −→ u0 σ mapping members of uσ to
members of u0 σ (recall that if p is a predicate, u0 must be Boolean , so that u0 σ is the set of Boolean values
T, F ). For each constant c with sort u , there is a specific member cσ of uσ . Finally, each axiom of T must be
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valid for all quantities uσ , pσ , cσ . In other words, the theory T must be valid for the structure σ obtained by
replacing its sorts, operations and constants with the indicated quantities.
For an example of a model, consider the previously-discussed instances in the triangle example. A model σ
constructed with the Euclidean plane in mind has uσ as the set of points in the plane if u is the sort Points .
If u is the sort Lines , on the other hand, then uσ is the set of straight lines in the plane. In theory T5 , for
example, the operation on : Points ∗ Lines− > Boolean can be represented by a function pσ : uσ −→ u0 σ ,
where uσ = (Points ∗ Lines)σ = Pointsσ × Linesσ and u0 σ = Booleanσ . The predicate pσ has the value
T for those point-line pairs having the property that the point lies on the line. The axiom
...
Axiom Two-points-define-a-line is
forall(x, y:Points) ((x not= y) implies
(exists l:Lines) (on (x, l) and on (y, l) and
((forall m:lines) (on (x, m) and on (y, m)) implies (m = l) ))
holds for all quantities x, y ∈ Pointsσ satisfying the stated pre-condition: That is, there exists a unique
member of Linesσ defined by x and y . The same holds in any model of the theories T1 — T4 . However, notice
that there can be members σ of Mod(T1 ) that do not have specifically identified members of Linesσ for any of
the line constants la, lb, lc because T1 does not specify any line constants. However, specific lines serving in
the roles of the three line constants must exist in any member of Mod(T5 ) .
Another example can be formed from the pebbles-on-a-sidewalk example. Consider a region delineated on a
sidewalk with specific positions marked for all possible placements of pebbles. A model of T5 then has a specific
layout of pebbles representing the point constants, with the point constant representatives labelled, with paint,
say. It can also contain other pebbles (shaped or colored differently, perhaps) to represent all the other points
on the three lines chosen to represent the line constants; the three line constant representatives can be indicated
by placing an appropriately-labelled piece of tape at one end of each. The specified points and lines must be
configured, collectively, to satisfy the axioms of T5 . Interestingly, notice that the pebbles could be either pixels or
groups of pixels in a video image. The lines could likewise represent linear configurations of pixels, and so forth.
Models constructed in this “image space” are suggestive of the use of model theory in analyzing the relationship
between the processing in a neural network trained to recognize geometric objects and the structure of its input
environment consisting of sensor images.
The notion that a more specific concept T 0 can incorporate a less specific (more abstract) concept T has
already been formalized in the definition of a concept morphism s: T −→ T 0 . In correspondence with this, the
notion that each model of T 0 corresponds to a model of T is captured in the definition of a model-space morphism
Mod(s): Mod(T 0 ) −→ Mod(T ) . The morphism Mod(s) acts as a function that maps every model σ0 in Mod(T 0 ) to
a unique model σ in Mod(T ) , that is, σ = Mod(s)(σ0 ) . Notice that Mod(s) has the reverse direction to s , as is
appropriate. Since the theory T typically has less structure (fewer sorts, operations, constants, and/or axioms)
than the theory T 0 , the model σ is not required to have all the sets, functions, predicates, and specified members
(constants) that σ0 must have, and is only required to obey the axioms of T , which are typically fewer in number
than those of T 0 . Nothing prevents a model of T from having all the structure of a model of T 0 ; it is just the
case that an arbitrary model of T is not required to have all the structure that an arbitrary model of T 0 is required
to have. By the same token, there can be many models in Mod(T ) that are not the image of a model in Mod(T 0 )
under the mapping Mod(s) : A simpler theory poses fewer restrictions on its models, hence, there can be more of
them.
We can extend the examples of models just discussed to obtain examples of model-space morphisms. In the
pebbles-on-a-sidewalk example, any model σ00 in Mod(T5 ) maps to a model σ0 in Mod(T2 ) , thence to a model
σ in Mod(T 1) , via the composition Mod(s1 ) ◦ Mod(`2 ) of the model-space morphisms Mod(`2 ): Mod(T5 ) −→
Mod(T2 ) and Mod(s1 ): Mod(T2 ) −→ Mod(T1 ) . At each stage, the model derived from σ00 can have the same
appearance: Although models of T2 and T1 are not required to contain all that is specified for models of T5 ,
those derived directly from models such as σ00 via the model-space morphisms can retain all the structure of σ00 ,
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or be part of a system that does so, while other models not so derived have less structure. Thus, although the
model σ may retain the triangle built from pebbles as in σ00 (but perhaps with differently-colored pebbles and
perhaps with some deleted), other members of Mod(T1 ) need have no triangle, nor any specified lines. However,
they must have at least one designated pebble serving in the role of the point constants.
Notice the use of the term “model spaces” as opposed to “sets of models”. As noted previously, a different
amount of structure is required of arbitrary models of two theories serving as the domain and codomain of
a model-space morphism. This suggests that some models in a given model space are more elaborate than
others, and that a less elaborate model can be thought of as embedded in another model that happens to satisfy
more constraints. In actuality, this notion is expressed through model morphisms, and, indeed, the model spaces
Mod(T ) are in actuality categories and the model-space morphisms Mod(s): Mod(T 0 ) −→ Mod(T ) are functors.
On the other hand, we use the term “space” rather than “category” because we do not intend to explore the
categorical properties of model spaces in this report. However, for completeness, it is desirable to point out
that the categorical formulation applies within as well as between model spaces. Overall, there is a functor
Mod: Concept −→ Cat , where Cat is a category whose objects are categories and whose morphisms are functors.
The concept object images Mod(T ) are objects in Cat and the concept morphism images Mod(s): Mod(T 0 ) −→
Mod(T ) are morphisms of Cat . See [36] or [16] for a further discussion of model categories and [34] or [1] for
foundational issues concerning the existence of a category of categories.
We shall relate the model spaces and their morphisms to neural architectures following a discussion of our
categorical formulation for the latter. Several items must be discussed before doing this.

4

Neural Architectures and Neural Categories

Since the point of our categorical concept representation is to express the semantics of neural networks, we need
a category within which neural structure can be represented. By neural structure, we mean not just the interconnection structure joining the nodes of a neural network, but the systematic activity of its nodes and connections
in interacting with its environment. The objective is to explain the activity of any neural network arising from
its inputs in terms of the concept structure that network is capable of acquiring, and also to explain how neural
activity is related to the acquisition of a concept structure. In accomplishing this, a category representing a neural architecture need not include all the details of the neural network computations; it need only represent the
outcome of the computations in expressing and learning concepts and concept morphisms.

4.1

Architectures

A neural network architecture A has nodes pi (i = 1, 2, . . . , nN ) and connections ck (k = 1, 2, . . . , nC ) , where
nN , nC are positive integers. The nodes have signal functions φi : R −→ R , where R is the set of real numbers1 .
For example, the commonly-used sigmoid with a threshold value θT,i is
ξi = φi (θi ) =

1
1+e

− (θi − θT,i )

(i = 1, 2, . . . , nN ),

(3)

where the argument θi is an activation potential. Each connection ck joins a pair of nodes, its source pi = nS (ck )
and its target p j = nT (ck ) (1 ≤ i, j ≤ nN ) . If i = j , ck is an autoconnection through which pi either stimulates
or inhibits itself, depending upon whether ck is excitatory or inhibitory.
1 The system R of real numbers is used here purely for simplicity, since it has familiarity in the connectionist literature. Certain subsets
of R could have been specified instead to represent the domain and codomain of a signal function. In fact, the semantic model does not
depend upon the use of the real number system at all: functions defined over the rationals, the complex numbers, or other algebraic structures
with additive and multiplicative structures can be used instead, with the proper care taken to ensure consistency of the resulting analysis. For
example, R is a complete, ordered field; many other algebraic systems do not have this combination of properties. One result of this is that
the intervals used here in defining neural objects must be replaced by other kinds of sets when using these systems.
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In the usual discrete neural network model, such as the perceptron, the activation potential θi is
θi = Σµ∈di wµ δµ

(4)

where each δµ is an output signal ξ` emitted by some node p` (` ∈ di ) where di is the set of input connections
−
to pi , δµ = ξ−
` = φ` (θ` ) , and p` = nS (cµ ) , pi = nT (cµ ) , and wµ is the current weight value for connection
(cµ . A fixed set of input nodes ph (h ∈ SI ⊆ {1, . . . , nN }) is typically defined for an architecture, and in many
cases also a set of output nodes pω (ω ∈ SO ⊆ {1, . . . , nN }) . Input nodes require an additional term in their input
sum to account for the external input, viz.,
θi = Σµ∈di wµ δµ + Ii .

(5)

In architectures such as perceptrons, input nodes receive external inputs only; in this case, the input node has
input sum
θi = Ii .
(6)
As soon as the current activation values θi for the nodes are computed, the signal functions are evaluated to
compute an output,
ξi = φi (θi ) .
(7)
A neural architecture A has an infinite number of possible weight states w . A weight state is an nC -tuple
(w1 , w2 , . . . wnC ) of numerical values wk for the connections ck (k = 1, 2, . . . , nC ) . The network transitions from
one weight state to another by virtue of its conectionist learning algorithm, usually based upon some variant of
Hebb’s law[24]. Activation and learning in a neural network occur simultaneously in response to the input patterns
the network processes. Activation and learning are combined mathematically to define global state transitions as
part of the definition of a neural category. Before discussing neural categories, let us explain in more detail what
it means to have a semantic model for neural networks.

4.2

Neural Processing and Semantics

A basic assumption of any neural network model is that a stimulus pattern I presented to the input nodes represents an event — an object, entity, situation, visual scene, or some representative of the network’s environment
that has significance “for the network”. Another assumption is that the representation is consistent across all
events; that is, the algorithm or sensing method that converts events to input patterns remains fixed as the input
stream progresses. These assumptions are fundamental to the analyst’s ability to make sense of the phenomena
observed as a network processes its input stream, whether the network is artificial or biological. In the analyst’s view, each input pattern I associates, or bind, the network to its environment. The network is supposed
to adapt from a sequence of inputs so that it can respond to future inputs from the environment in a manner that
the analyst considers reasonable. Semantic modeling is a vehicle for understanding this process by employing
the precision of a mathematical language to describe the contents of the information supplied by environmental
events as represented by the input patterns, the consequent representation of the environment learned by the network and stored in its connection weight array, and the outputs the network generates. The explicit representation
of knowledge about entities and their properties and relationships contained in the descriptions can make visible
the assumptions implicit in a neural network model so that they, too, become amenable to analysis.
To even begin to understand the information content of events and the consequent neural representation of the
environment, we need an unambiguous, precise language capable of expressing the properties of and relationships
among arbitrary entities. To be useful in analysis, the language must be flexible, able to express the properties of
many entities in combination and the properties of complex entities in terms of the properties and relationships
of their parts. For example, the property of balance in a painting arises from the spatial relationships of the
shapes, colors and textures within it; a blue patch of water to the lower left is reflected in a scattering of blue
flowers on the river bank at the upper right, and so forth. In many cases involving the “emergent” property of a
system of entities, on the other hand, the association of the system property with those of its components may
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not be obvious on the surface, but if it arises systematically the association must be expressible mathematically.
In any case, the key to semantic modeling is to be able to associate, again unambiguously and with precision,
the descriptions in our language with the structure and operations of a computational entity such as a neural
network. An important notion we use for this association is that the description associated with an event can be
seen as a part of a longer, more detailed description associated with that which produced the event. Thus, the
descriptions associated with the inputs to the network exist at various levels of detail, from the abstract to the
specific. Furthermore, the network, given a sufficiently rich input format, can reconstruct much of the complexity
of the environment in its internal representation of the information it gains from the input representation of the
events. Again, the descriptions of simple and complex entities are related. We wish to associate this hierarchy
of descriptions with the learning of environmental representations and their storage in and retrieval from a neural
network’s connection-weight memory.
This line of thought has two consequences for our purposes: First, one or more of the pattern values in an
input I represent a concept, a description of something which, when sampled (say, by apprehending examples of
it), generates events. A single pattern may represent several such concepts. Second, a concept has sub-concepts,
or embedded concepts, representing different aspects of the event-generator. For example, the pattern values
in I represent pieces of information about an event, such as boundary segments of shapes appearing in visual
images; each is describable as a boundary segment, an aspect of a boundary; each description is a concept. The
full boundary helps to delineate a shape appearing in the image, so it is itself an aspect (the shape) of a yet
more complex object captured in the image. Other aspects of the object are its colors, textures, and shading or
the indication of three- dimensionality; all have descriptions, and all descriptions are concepts. The boundary
segment concepts are sub-concepts of the boundary shape concept, and it, in turn, is a sub-concept of a full
description of an object, along with other sub-concepts describing color, texture and so forth. Further, an object
is more than it appears in a visual image: It can be an entity that also produces sounds, has a touch and feel,
and other properties; therefore, the visual object concept is a sub-concept of a complex concept describing the
whole object. Objects of any possible kind may exist in a system of interacting entities, such as people in a
social situation or vehicles in a traffic network. The individual object concepts are therefore sub-concepts of a
description of a system, which also contains descriptions of the ways in which individuals can interact. From this,
it is evident that concepts normally exist in a hierarchy given by a sub-concept relation. This is a re-statement of
the fact that the descriptions of simple and complex entities are related.
A concept can be transformed significantly when used as a sub-concept in more complex concepts, or it can
be used in several ways. Therefore, although we often describe a concept relation as a sub-concept relation,
the term “concept morphism” is more generally applicable. This brings us to the use of the category Concept
for representing the semantics of a neural network. A network forms an internal representation of the concept
category to greater or lesser extent depending upon its ability to learn and represent concepts at all levels of the
hierarchy. The part of the category that it can fully represent in its connection weight array at any point in its
learning history constitutes a “knowledge base”, one which it updates incrementally. Our objective is to provide
a mathematical framework that explains the output responses and the connection weights of an arbitrary neural
network in terms of an internal knowledge base, and explains the weight modifications in terms of updates to the
knowledge base. This explanation is an understanding of the semantics of the neural network.
If the connection weight changes are to be effective in accumulating the knowledge implicit in a stream of
input patterns, they must incorporate previously obtained information in the formulation of new information as
each pattern is processed. This systematic change, therefore, involves the re-use of prior knowledge and can be
seen as the derivation of concepts from previously-learned concepts. Each network response to an input pattern
either represents a system of concepts pre-existing in the network’s internal knowledge base or else prescribes
the derivation of a concept new to the network’s representation. A prescription for a derivation is represented
by the activated nodes and connections between them that represent pre-existing concept representations and
relationships between them, beginnning with the input nodes. This can be represented by the mapping of a
diagram in Concept to a diagram in a neural category, once we have defined what is meant by a neural category.
We measure the activation values θi of the nodes pi (i = 1, 2, . . . , nN ) of a neural network indirectly, by
observing their outputs ξi = φi (θi ) . The value ξi represents a concept in the existing knowledge base. For
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example, a particular output value ξh for an input node ph might be associated with a concept such as “event X
produces a horizontal contour segment at location L in the image”, where the “strength” of the contour at location
L is associated with a range of output values for ph . Leaving open the possibility that a range of values ξh
might be associated with a horizontal contour segment occurring at location L for “noise immunity”, it is best to
associate the contour segment at L with a set η of values η = {ξ | ` < ξ < u} (if ξh takes real values, η is a
real interval and may be arbitrarily small). The occurrence of a value lying within η signifies an instance of the
concept of a horizontal bar occurring at location L. Thus, in general, concepts about events are represented by
node/interval pairs (pi , η) , where η is a range ( for example, a real interval) of output values for pi .
Now, for any node pi , we can trace backward through its input connections in the network, eventually determining how its output value ξi is formed by combining and transforming input node values through the weighted
connection pathways leading to it. If we can describe how this combining works in terms of the input node/interval
concepts, then, outputs ξi for node pi can be related to a derivation of the concept associated with them in terms
of concepts and relationships associated with the nodes and connections relating pi to nodes such as ph . As with
the input nodes, the values ξi are best regarded as points within a set (for example, a real interval) η .
Examining this from the opposite perspective, what tells us that (pi , η) represents a given concept T , or
that it represents any concepts at all? For example, suppose T describes the layout of a room seen from some
viewpoint (e.g., “The room contains a chair and a table. The chair sits behind the table.”) We might be led to
the supposition that (pi , η) represents T by noticing that an output ξi for pi falls within the interval η when an
input pattern representing a camera image of the room is presented to the input nodes. However, this conclusion
is not necessarily an accurate assertion about the semantics of (pi , η) . For if pi is an input node, it could simply
be that a particular region of the camera image yields a segment of an image contour that indicates the presence of
the chair, or the table, but does not describe either entity in any more detail than that. The same contour segment
(such as a horizontal bar) could just as easily describe any of hundreds of other items in the room, or in other,
completely unrelated camera images. To represent the entire room view, (pi , η) must represent “downstream”
processing of the image contour segment together with many other image features.
The need to establish the semantics of quantities such as (pi , η) unambigously and with precision is the
reason for having a mathematical semantic model. The outputs a node pi will generate at a given time depends
upon its connection-weighted inputs, its signal function, and its current activity. We can account for the other
quantities by observing the node’s properties, but its inputs through connections involve its relationship with its
immediate neighbors. Semantics involves relationships and, categorically, relationships are the morphisms in
a category. We have a declarative basis for expressing semantics with concept morphisms; to understand the
declarative semantics of a neural network, we need to have a mathematical model that includes neural morphisms
and how the two kinds of morphisms are related.

4.3

Neural Categories

There is an infinite number of possible neural network architectures A , and each has an infinite number of
possible weight states w . In analyzing or designing a specific neural network, artificial or biological, we either
assume or provide a structure for A that contains enough nodes and connections to account for the appearance
of previously-unused nodes or connections as the network evolves through learning or growth. In an artificial
network, for example, many connections can initially be assigned weight values close to zero. Their values can
then increase if they happen to be recruited as significant contributors to network processing by the learning
algorithm for A . In a biological system, an increase from an initial near-zero value can be used to represent
either adaptation (learning) or the growth of a new connection. In any case, the semantic model associates each
combination of A and w with a category NA,w . Each input pattern e for A results in activity in its nodes and
connections, and this together with the connectionist structure of A is involved in the definitions of objects and
morphisms for NA,w . Weight adaptation, or “learning”, changes one or more of the components wk of w , a
consequence of the node activities resulting from the processing of e . This is represented in the semantic model
as a transition between categories.

Healy and Caudell—Category Theory ...

19

Our mathematical model addresses the semantics of the network processing explicitly, but regards neural
dynamics and notions of time and state change only as a means of carrying out the computations involved. We
shall assume that the computations proceed, and confine our interest to the knowledge representation scheme that
we use to express the semantics. To model the processing of an arbitrary neural network, therefore, we use a
transformation that expresses only the neural network computational states of significance for semantic analysis.
Let WA , ΘA , EA denote the spaces of weight tuples, activation tuples and input tuples for A , respectively. To
represent the activation and learning algorithms associated with the architecture, we define a function ΦA :WA ×
ΘA ×EA −→ WA ×ΘA . The function ΦA maps an nC +nN +nI -tuple of initial weights, activation values and input
values to a resultant nC + nN -tuple of weights and activation values. It expresses the totality of neural processing
of the input via weighted summation of the inputs at each node, the signal function evaluations ξi = φi (θi ) , and
any other assumptions embodied in the rules for activation in A , including feedback, recurrence, and connection
weight adaptation. It is meant to represent the processing in a significant computational step in an arbitrary
architectural model, whether discrete or continuous. We write (v, ψ) = ΦA (w, θ, e) , with w, v ∈ WA ; θ, ψ ∈
ΘA ; e ∈ EA .
Based upon the discussion in the previous sub-section, an obvious choice for the objects of a neural category
NA,w is the collection of pairs (pi , η) , where pi is a node of A and η is a set of output values for pi that has
some significance in our analysis. There may be many such output sets, so a single node can be associated with
many objects, depending upon the needs of the analysis to be perfomed. In any case, we refer to the node pi as
the carrier of any object of the form (pi , η) .
Let two concepts T1 , T2 be represented by objects (pi , η), (p j , η0 ) , respectively, in the category NA,w . Although the morphisms of NA,w have not been defined as yet, one would expect that any concept morphisms
between T1 , T2 would be represented as morphisms of NA,w by virtue of the activity in the weighted network
connections between the nodes pi , p j . To begin relating activity in a neural architecture to morphisms in its
associated neural category, we define a signal path γ with source (pi , η) and target (p j , η0 ) as a connection path ck1 , ck2 , . . . ckn with nonzero weights, wkr 6= 0 (r = 1, . . . , n) , together with a sequence of nodes
pµ1 , pµ2 , . . . , pµn , pµn+1 and intervals η1 , η2 , . . . , ηn , ηn+1 , where pi = pµ1 = nS (ck1 ) , pµr = nS (ckr ) and
pµr+1 = nT (ckr ) (r = 1, . . . , n) , p j = pµn+1 = nT (ckn ) . Thus, a signal path is a connection path between (pi , η)
and (p j , η0 ) which, if it has any intermediate nodes (i.e., if there is more than one connection in the path), has
specified output intervals for those nodes. We can represent γ by the string [(pµ1 , η1 ), ck1 , (pµ2 , η2 ), ck2 , (pµ3 , η3 ), . . . ,
(pµn , ηn ), ckn , (pµn+1 , ηn+1 )] , which shows the layout of objects and connections along the path. The path has
source and target objects (pi , η) = (pµ1 , η1 ) = oS (γ) and (p j , η0 ) = (pµn+1 , ηn+1 ) = oT (γ) , the others being
referred to as intermediate objects.
Let θ denote an arbitrary nN -tuple (θ1 , θ2 , . . . , θnN ) of activation states θi for the nodes pi (i = 1, . . . , nN )
of NA,w . Let e denote an arbitrary nI -tuple (e1 , e2 , . . . , enI ) of input pattern values, where nI is, as before, the
number of nodes in the input node set SI , with nI = card(SI ) ≤ nN . Matching input pattern components to
the input nodes that receive them is done by associating each input pattern index h (1 ≤ h ≤ nI ) to a unique
node index i (1 ≤ i ≤ nN ) such that eh = Ii , where pi is the appropriate input node. When the nodes pµr in
a path γ produce outputs lying within the intervals ηr , where γ = [(pµ1 , η1 ), ck1 , (pµ2 , η2 ), ck2 , (pµ3 , η3 ), . . . ,
(pµn , ηn ), ckn , (pµn+1 , ηn+1 )] , we say that the objects (pµr , ηr ), are activated.
The combination of a signal path γ with source and target (pi , η) = oS (γ) and (p j , η0 ) = oT (γ) , together
with a weight state w , has an associated set Uγ,w of pairs (θ, e) ∈ ΘA × EA satisfying the following requirements:
1. For all nodes pµr of γ (r = 1, . . . , n) , φr (θr ), φr (ψr ) ∈ ηr , where for some v ∈ WA , (v, ψ) = ΦA (w, θ, e) .
2. For every connection (ckr ) of γ , vkr 6= 0 (r = 1, . . . , n) .
In particular, (1) holds for the source and target nodes, φi (θi ), φi (ψi ) ∈ η and φ j (θ j ), φ j (ψ j ) ∈ η . In other words,
the pairs (θ, e) in Uγ,w are combinations of initial activation values and inputs for the network whose subsequent
processing does not change the objects that are activated along the path γ , even with accompanying changes in
some or all network connection weights (as long as the weights do not become zero). The elements (θ, e) ∈ Uγ,w
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are called instances of γ in weight state w . The totality of elements (θ, e) associated with a node pi generating
an output within the designated interval η of a neural object (pi , η) are called instances of (pi , η) .
For each set Γ of paths γ having common source and target (pi , η) and (p j , η0 ) (where now we write
(pi , η) = oS (Γ), (p j , η0 ) = oT (Γ) , and each weight state
w , there is an associated set of instances UΓ,w . This
T
is obtained by simply forming the intersection UΓ,w = Uγ,w (γ ∈ Γ) . We say that two path sets Γ and Γ0 with
a common source and target are equivalent in weight state w , denoted Γ ≡w Γ0 , if UΓ,w = UΓ0 ,w . All path sets
which are pairwise equivalent have the same closure, a path set Γw that contains all their members. Thus, when
Γ ≡w Γ0 , we can write Γw = Γ0 w . A path set of the form Γw , where Γ is an arbitrary path set, is called closed
in weight state w . Notice, finally, that UΓw ,w = UΓ,w .
We are now ready to say what we mean by a neural morphism. A morphism m: (pi , η) −→ (p j , η0 ) in a
neural category NA,w is given by the following:
1. A domain object (pi , η) ,
2. a codomain object (p j , η0 ) ,
3. a path set Γ having (pi , η) = oS (γ) and (p j , η0 ) = oT (γ) (γ ∈ Γ) , and
4. the set UΓ,w of pairs (θ, e) , with (θ, e) ∈ UΓ,w ⊆ ΘA × EA , where for each path γ ∈ Γ with
γ = [(pµ1 , η1 ), ck1 , (pµ2 , η2 ), ck2 , (pµ3 , η3 ), . . . , (pµn , ηn ), ckn , (pµn+1 , ηn+1 )] , we have φµr (θµr ) ∈ ηr , φµr (ψµr ) ∈
ηr for (r = 1, . . . , n) , where (v, ψ) = ΦA (w, θ, e) for some v ∈ WA .
Any set Γ0 with Γ ≡w Γ0 defines the same morphism. Thus, a morphism can be represented by a weight state
w and any of its path sets Γ, Γ0 , . . . , which have the same source and target nodes and are associated with the
same set of instances, UΓ,w = UΓ0 ,w = . . . . Given any of its equivalent path sets Γ and the weight state w of its
category, we refer to a morphism m as the morphism associated with the pair (Γ, w) , and we write Um = UΓ,w
(the dependence of Um on w is appropriate because a morphism is specific to its category, in this case NA,w ).
Conversely, each of its path sets is called a carrier for the morphism in weight state w .
The definition of composition for morphisms in a category NA,w is really rather obvious, given our notions
of what constitutes a morphism. Consider a pair of morphisms m1 , m2 , with a path set Γ1 , Γ2 , , respectively
for each, with associated sets UΓ1 ,w , UΓ2 ,w of instances, where oS (Γ2 ) = oT (Γ1 ) . We can form the intersection
UΓ3 ,w = UΓ2 ,w ∩ UΓ1 ,w , where Γ3 contains the concatenations γ; γ0 of all pairs of paths γ ∈ Γ1 , γ0 ∈ Γ2 , which is
possible because oS (γ0 ) = oT (γ) for all such pairs. For example, if
γ = [(pµ1 , η1 ), ck1 , (pµ2 , η2 ), ck2 , (pµ3 , η3 ), . . . , (pµn , ηn ), ckn , (pµn+1 , ηn+1 )] and
γ0 = [(pµn+1 , ηn+1 ), ckn+1 , (pµn+2 , ηn+2 ), ckn+2 , (pµn+3 , ηn+3 ), . . . , (pµn+n0 , ηn+n0 ), ckn+n0 , (pµn+n0 +1 , ηn+n0 +1 )] , then
γ; γ0 = [(pµ1 , η1 ), ck1 , (pµ2 , η2 ), ck2 , (pµ3 , η3 ), . . . , (pµn , ηn ), ckn , (pµn+1 , ηn+1 ),
ckn+1 , (pµn+2 , ηn+2 ), ckn+2 , (pµn+3 , ηn+3 ), . . . , (pµn+n0 , ηn+n0 ), ckn+n0 , (pµn+n0 +1 , ηn+n0 +1 )] .
With these definitions, the pair (Γ3 , w) uniquely defines a morphism m3 : (pµ1 , η1 ) −→ (pµn+n0 +1 , ηn+n0 +1 ) , that
is, m3 = m2 ◦ m1 , having as one of its path sets Γ3 = {γ; γ0 | γ ∈ Γ1 , γ0 ∈ Γ2 } , with UΓ3 ,w = UΓ2 ,w ∩ UΓ1 ,w and
with (pµ1 , η1 ) = oS (Γ3 ) and (pµn+n0 +1 , ηn+n0 +1 ) = oT (Γ3 ) . The operation ◦ for morphisms associated with the
concatenations of path sets, such that the source of one set is the target of the other, can always be defined and
yields a unique result.
Notice that there can be path sets Γ whose source and target are one and the same object (pi , η) , with
oS (Γ) = (pi , η) = oT (Γ) . For each w and each such path set there is a morphism m: (pi , η) −→ (pi , η) of
NA,w . For each object (pi , η) , we define a particular path set which is of fundamental importance: The singleton
{[(pi , η), (pi , η)]} , whose only member we call the virtual path for (pi , η) . It is a path with no connection;
instances of it are simply instances of (pi , η) . Its importance lies in its use in defining the identity morphism
id(pi , η) as the morphism associated with ({[(pi , η), (pi , η)]}, w) . It is now a straightforward exercise to show
that the composition as defined is associative and has an identity for each object. Therefore, the quantities we
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have been calling objects and morphisms satisfy the two axioms of composition, hence, they really are objects
and morphisms and NA,w with these definitions is indeed a category.
We denote by Uid(p , η),w the instance set of the virtual path for object (pi , η) (hence, the instance set of the
i
identity morphism for the object). Any path set Γ equivalent to {[(pi , η), (pi , η)]} , that is, Γ ≡w {[(pi , η), (pi , η)]} ,
has the same instances, hence, is acting collectively as the virtual path, UΓ,w = Uid(p , η),w . Notice that the instance
i
set of an identity morphism is just the instance set of its object, Uid(p , η),w = U(pi , η) .
i

4.4

Example: A Simple Multi-Layer Perceptron Network

Consider a category NA,w representing a multi-layer feedforward network with weight state w . Here, the function
ΦA represents all processing that occurs in a single iteration of a learning algorithm for feedforward networks
such as the perceptron algorithm[35]. For simplicity, let the nodes pi act as binary nodes in representing concepts, where positive outputs signify events associated with a concept represented by the node; all outputs not
sufficiently positive are regarded as having either uncertain or no significance. Given this one-to-one correspondence between nodes and objects, substituting pi for (pi , η) simplifies notation, and any output ξi = φi (θi ) > 0
is an instance of the object pi .
Figure 9 shows a part of the MLP network, with selected nodes in what we shall refer to as layers n, n + 1
and n + 2 , and selected connections between them. Although there can be many other nodes present, we refer
to the nodes shown in the figure as p1 (in Layer n ), p2 and p3 (in Layer n + 1 ) and p4 (in Layer n + 2 ).
The connections are also labelled as, for example, c1 (from p1 to p2 ). From the definition of neural morphism
just given, there is a morphism corresponding to the set Γ1w , where Γ1 contains a path associated with the single
connection c1 , that is, γ1 = [(p1 , η), c1 , (p2 , η)] . In fact, since the architecture is a feedforward network and
c1 connects nodes across adjacent layers ( n and n + 1 ), γ1 is the only possible member of Γ1w , hence, of
Γ1 , unless we allow there to be multiple connections between two nodes. Denote the morphism associated with
the pair (Γ1 , w) by m1 : (p1 , η) −→ (p2 , η) . Because of our one-to-one node-to-object representation, we can
simplify the notation for our example and instead write γ1 = [p1 , c1 , p2 ] and m1 : p1 −→ p2 .
The instances of m1 are all combinations (θ, e) ∈ ΘA × EA of network activation states and network input
patterns from UΓ1 ,w . Since oS (Γ1 ) = (p1 , η) = p1 and oT (Γ1 ) = (p2 , η) = p2 , these are instances of both
(p1 , η) and (p2 , η) (that is, ξ1 = φ1 (θ1 ) ∈ η, ξ2 = φ1 (θ2 ) ∈ η , and similarly for the outputs evaluated at ψ ,
where (v, ψ) = ΦA (w, θ, e) ). Note that it matters not whether the weight w1 of c1 is w1 > 0 or w1 < 0 , only
that w1 (and also v1 ) is nonzero and that the nodes along the path γ1 ( p1 and p2 ) are generating outputs within
their specified intervals (the interval η ).
Again using the fact that each node corresponds to a single object in the current example, we can express the
paths corresponding to connections c2 , c3 , and c4 as γ2 = [p1 , c2 , p3 ] , γ3 = [p2 , c3 , p4 ] and γ4 = [p3 , c4 , p4 ] ,
respectively. Assuming that there is at most one connection between each pair of nodes in adjacent layers, the
path sets Γ2 , Γ3 , Γ4 have solely the following members: γ2 ∈ Γ2 , γ3 ∈ Γ3 , γ4 ∈ Γ4 . Corresponding to these,
there are sets UΓ2 ,w , UΓ3 ,w , and UΓ4 ,w whose members are the initial network activation and input combinations
(θ, e) ∈ ΘA × EA that result in outputs ξ1 , ξ3 ∈ η (i.e., ξ1 = φ1 (θ1 ) > 0, ξ3 = φ1 (θ3 ) > 0 ) for the source and
target nodes simultaneously for γ2 , ξ2 , ξ4 ∈ η for γ3 , and ξ3 , ξ4 ∈ η for γ4 . This describes the morphisms
associated with the connections c1 , c2 , c3 , c4 , which we shall call m1 : p1 −→ p2 , m2 : p1 −→ p3 , m3 : p2 −→ p4 ,
and m4 : p3 −→ p4 , respectively.
Now let us examine some compositions and characterize any commutative diagrams that might involve the
objects and morphisms associated with the array of connections c1 , c2 , c3 , c4 . Concatenating paths, we have
paths γ5 = [p1 , c1 , p2 , c3 , p4 ] and γ6 = [p1 , c2 , p3 , c4 , p4 ] , two separate paths with the same source and target.
Letting Γ5 = {γ5 } and Γ6 = {γ6 } , with UΓ5 ,w = UΓ3 ,w ∩ UΓ1 ,w , UΓ6 ,w = UΓ4 ,w ∩ UΓ2 ,w , we have morphisms
m5 = m3 ◦ m1 and m6 = m4 ◦ m2 . These are two morphisms with the same domain and codomain, m5 : p1 −→
p4 , associated with the pair (Γ5 , w) , and m6 : p1 −→ p4 , associated with the pair (Γ6 , w) . Now, were it the case
that UΓ5 ,w = UΓ6 ,w , i.e., that Γ5 ≡w Γ6 , then they would be one and the same morphism with domain p1 and
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Figure 9: Two connection paths corresponding to a commutative diagram. The bottom pair of connections
is seen emanating from a single node p1 serving as the carrier for diagram object (p1 , η1 ) . Similarly, the
top pair of connections is seen terminating upon a single node p4 serving as the carrier for diagram object
(p4 , η4 ) . The commutativity of the diagram indicates that the two paths are involved in an instance of the
same morphism with domain (p1 , η1 ) and codomain (p4 , η4 ) . All instances that define the diagram are
instances of this morphism.
codomain p4 , that is, it would be the case that m7 = m5 = m6 : p1 −→ p4 . However, in general, this will not prove
to be the case; because of the inputs to the intermediate nodes p2 and p3 through other connections emanating
from nodes in prior layers, it can happen that some instances of m5 are not instances of m6 because they are
instances of p2 but not p3 ; conversely, not all instances of m6 need be instances of m5 . Therefore, the diagram
defined by the morphisms m1 , m2 , m3 , and m4 need not be a commutative diagram, since the compositions
m3 ◦ m1 and m4 ◦ m2 need not be equal.
This examplifies an important fact: A set of paths having the same source and target objects can be involved
in several different morphisms and, in fact, can be involved in several different diagrams. Further, some of these
diagrams can be commutative while others are not. This is to say, although a morphism is uniquely defined by a
path set Γ and weight state w (because the pair (Γ, w) has a unique instance set UΓ,w associated with it), Γ can
also be involved in separate morphisms defined by larger path sets that contain it. The diamond-shaped diagram
defined by m1 , m2 , m3 , and m4 need not be commutative if we define these morphisms using the instance sets
UΓ1 ,w , UΓ2 ,w , UΓ3 ,w , UΓ4 ,w as in this example. However, there is a single morphism associated with the larger
path set consisting of the two paths through the connections c1 , c2 , c3 , and c4 : Simply let Γ7 be the union of
path sets Γ7 = Γ5 ∪ Γ6 = {γ5 , γ6 } . The instances of this union are the instances of the intersection, UΓ7 ,w =
UΓ5 ,w ∩ UΓ6 ,w . This defines a morphism m7 : p1 −→ p4 uniquely associated with the pair (Γ7 , w) . In case the
intersection is empty, UΓ5 ,w ∩ UΓ6 ,w = 0/ , m7 is referred to as a vacuous morphism, having no instances. In any
case, it is true that UΓ7 ,w ⊆ UΓ5 ,w and UΓ7 ,w ⊆ UΓ6 ,w . The subset relationship is proper in either or both cases
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unless the diagram commutes. Thus, there is a morphism associated with the two paths through the connections
c1 , c2 , c3 , and c4 regardless of whether the diagram involving m1 , m2 , m3 , and m4 is commutative.
Without being too specific about the total connectivity structure or the learning algorithm of our perceptronlike network example, or even the total range of neural computation represented by the activation function ΦA
used in defining morphisms, we have shown how morphisms, diagrams and commutative diagrams can be found
in neural network architectures. We have shown how to distinguish between a diagram and a commutative diagram, given the knowledge of whether or not certain path sets in the network have equal sets of instances (hence,
are equivalent) with respect to the array of network weights associated with the category under consideration.
With the categorical model for neural architectures in hand, we can proceed to investigate concept representation
and learning.

5

Functors: Transporting Structures Across Categories

5.1

Defining Functors Incrementally

We have defined categories Concept for an organized system of concepts and their relationships, and NA,w
to represent the system consisting of a neural network architecture A , a weight tuple w , and the activities associated with the pair (A, w) , which are represented by the network activity function ΦA . We now describe
the categorical representation of the concept system in the activities of the neural system, that is, the semantics of NA,w . Fundamental in the representation is the notion of a functor M: Concept −→ NA,w . It maps
each Concept morphism sκ : Tµ −→ Tν to an appropriate NA,w morphism M(sκ ): M(Tµ ) −→ M(Tν ) with domain (pi , η) = M(Tµ ) and codomain (p j , η0 ) = M(Tν ) . Consider the consequences of there being concept
morphisms, such as sκ0 : Tν −→ Tλ , whose domain is the codomain of sκ . We can form the composition sκ0 ◦ sκ ,
whose functorial image under M is M(sκ0 ◦ sκ ): M(Tµ ) −→ M(Tν ) . Because of the functorial property, we need
to ensure that our definition of M has as a consequence that M(sκ0 ◦ sκ ) = M(sκ0 ) ◦ M(sκ ) .
To see what this entails, recall that a pair (Γ, w) can uniquely represent M(sκ ) , where Γ is a set of paths of
the form γ = [(pµ1 , η1 ), ck1 , (pµ2 , η2 ), ck2 , (pµ3 , η3 ), . . . , (pµn , ηn ), ckn , (pµn+1 , ηn+1 )] . If we assign functorial
images to concepts such that the domain and codomain of M(sκ ) are M(Tµ ) = (pi , η) and M(Tν ) = (p j , η0 ) ,
then the common source and target objects of all of the paths γ in Γ must be (pµ1 , η1 ) = (pi , η) = oS (γ)
and (pµn+1 , ηn+1 ) = (p j , η0 ) = oT (γ) , respectively. The elements of the set of instances UΓ,w are the combinations of initial state and input, (θ, e) ∈ ΘA × EA , that initiate the neural network activities of A associated
with the NA,w morphism M(sκ ) . Similarly, M(sκ0 ): M(Tν ) −→ M(Tλ ) has domain M(Tν ) = (p j , η0 ) and also
a codomain M(Tλ ) = (p` , η00 ) , and can be represented by a pair (Γ0 , w) where Γ0 has elements of the form
γ0 = [(pν1 , η01 ), ck10 , (pν2 , η02 ), ck20 , (pν3 , η03 ), . . . , (pνn0 , η0n0 ), ck0 0 , (pνn0 +1 , η0n0 +1 ),, where (pν1 , η01 ) = (p j , η)
n
= (pµn+1 , ηn+1 ) (so that oS (γ0 ) = oT (γ) ) and (pνn0 +1 , ηn0 +1 ) = (p` , η00 ) .
By the definition of composition in the category NA,w , M(sκ0 ) ◦ M(sκ ) is representable by some pair (Γ00 , w) ,
where Γ00 = Γ; Γ0 contains the path concatenations
γ; γ0 = [(pµ1 , η1 ), ck1 , (pµ2 , η2 ), ck2 , (pµ3 , η3 ), . . . , (pµn , ηn ), ckn , (pµn+1 , ηn+1 ), ckn+1 , (pµn+2 , ηn+2 ),
ckn+2 , (pµn+3 , ηn+3 ), . . . , (pµn+n0 , ηn+n0 ), ckn+n0 , (pµn+n0 +1 , ηn+n0 +1 )] ,
where we have re-labelled as follows:
(pν1 , η01 ) =
ck10 =

(pµn+1 , ηn+1 ) ,
ckn+1 ,

(pν2 , η02 ) =
ck20 =

(pµn+2 , ηn+2 ) ,
ckn+2 ,

(pν3 , η03 ) =

(pµn+3 , ηn+3 ) ,
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...,
(pνn0 , η0n0 ) =
ck0 n0 =
(pνn0 +1 , η0n0 +1 ) =

(pµn+n0 , ηn+n0 ) ,
ckn+n0 ,
(pµn+n0 +1 , ηn+n0 +1 )] .

The set of instances of M(sκ0 ) ◦ M(sκ ) is the set UΓ00 ,w , which is just the intersection UΓ00 ,w = UΓ,w ∩ UΓ0 ,w . Thus,
we obtain the composition M(sκ0 ) ◦ M(sκ ): (pi , η) −→ (p` , η00 ) . We must take care in defining M so that each
such composition of concept morphism images in NA,w is actually the same as the image of the corresponding
composition of concept morphisms, M(sκ0 ◦ sκ ) . This can be done by defining M recursively so that if M(sκ ) is
representable by a pair (Γ, w) and M(sκ0 ) is representable by a pair (Γ0 , w) , then M(sκ0 ◦ sκ ) is representable by
the pair (Γ00 , w) , where Γ00 = Γ; Γ0 .

5.2

Example: Applying a Functor to a Diagram

Applying a functor M: Concept −→ NA,w to the colimit defining diagram ∆ requires the identification of neural
objects and morphisms to serve as the images M(T1 ), M(T2 ), M(T3 ), M(T4 ), M(T5 ) and
M(s1 ): M(T1 ) −→ M(T2 ) ,
M(s2 ): M(T1 ) −→ M(T3 ) ,
M(s3 ): M(T1 ) −→ M(T4 ) ,
M(`1 ): M(T1 ) −→ M(T5 ) ,
M(`2 ): M(T2 ) −→ M(T5 ) ,
M(`3 ): M(T3 ) −→ M(T5 ) ,
M(`4 ): M(T4 ) −→ M(T5 ) .
In addition, the functorial property requires that the resulting neural diagram, denoted M(∆) , must commute. This
requires that M(`2 ) ◦ M(s1 ) = M(`3 ) ◦ M(s2 ) = M(`4 ) ◦ M(s3 ) = M(s1 ) . If we can find the nodes pi and paths
γ that supply the basic structural shape for the diagram, and if we can then claim that there is a connection weight
array and network initial activations and inputs w, θ, e that help define the morphisms such that the diagram commutes, we can claim to have found that part of a functor consistent with the mapping of ∆ into a category NA,w for
the architecture A . To define the entire functor requires a scheme for calculating the images of arbitrary concepts
and concept morphisms. The functorial property facilitates this because it enables the calculation of the images
of all concept morphisms M(u) obtainable by composition, where M(u) = M(s) ◦ M(t) ,given that the factors
M(s), M(t) are known. In particular, applying the functoriality property to define functors in this incremental
fashion guarantees the preservation of diagram commutativity. Applying functoriality requires first specifying
a basic collection of concept and morphism images in terms of neural objects and morphisms associated with
architectural items such as input nodes and the connection paths from them to other nodes.
There are other requirements in addition to functoriality for the images of the defining diagrams of colimits
and limits. Initiality and terminality are among these. For example, in addition to the commutativity of diagram
M(∆) , its cocone must be initial. Now, functors that preserve initiality and terminality of colimit cocones and
limit cones are of a special kind. Ensuring that the functors discussed here have this property poses an additional
design constraint for neural network architectures.
But there is another constraint whose severity depends upon how explicitly we want the functor M to represent the concepts and morphisms of Concept through the objects and morphisms of NA,w . Requiring the
representation to be very explicit places great demands upon the architectural constructions we use in A . The
discussion of Section 6 explores this “explicitness” constraint in more detail.
At this juncture in our presentation, it is apparent that applying the categorical model of neural network
semantics is a complex undertaking. Its use poses many constraints upon architectural analysis and design. It is
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important to observe that this is an advantage more than it is a burden. Design constraints are the conceptual tools
that make it possible to fully understand and to create neural network architectures based upon the knowledge
structures they purport to represent.

5.3

Neural Models

A functor M: Concept −→ NA,w maps concepts T, T 0 and morphisms s: T −→ T 0 to neural category objects
and morphisms M(T ), M(T 0 ) and M(s): M(T ) −→ M(T 0 ) . As discussed previously, there is also a functor
Mod: Concept −→ Cat which maps the concepts and morphisms to model spaces and model-space morphisms
Mod(T ), Mod(T 0 ) and Mod(s): Mod(T 0 ) −→ Mod(T ) , respectively. The functor Mod is called contravariant because it reverses the directions of the arrows of Concept .
Now, the instances of a neural object (pi , η) are pairs (θ, e) ∈ ΘA × EA . There is a difficulty in regarding
an instance (θ, e) as a model σ of a theory. As defined, instances do not have the correct mathematical form
to be models: A model σ is an object of a model space Mod(T ) and has a structure obtained by substituting
sets and functions for the sorts and operations of the theory T such that the axioms of T are valid for the
resulting system of sets and functions . Although not in the mathematical form of a theory model, however, an
instance (θ, e) corresponds to a model σ . Consider a theory morphism such as `2 : T2 −→ T5 in our triangle
example. The concepts T2 and T5 are mapped to neural category objects (pi , η), , (p j , η0 ) , respectively, by a
functor M —for example, (pi , η) = M(T2 ) , with instances (θ, e) , where (θ, e) ∈ U(pi , η) ⊆ ΘA × EA . Since each
such instance represents, through its component e , an input from the environment EA , it can also be associated
with a situation, or event, within the environment as represented by the sensors providing input to the network.
Each event that produces a member of U(pi , η) , on the other hand, can be regarded as a model of T2 , that is,
as some member σ of Mod(T2 ) . To construct this model from the environment requires a knowledge of the
quantities constituting the environment sufficient to enable the proper substitutions to be made in terms of sets
and functions for the quantities in the theory T2 . The model-space morphisms associated with concept morphisms
such as Mod(`2 ): Mod(T5 ) −→ Mod(T2 ) can be indexed by neural morphism instances in similar fashion.
As important as the correspondence between the functors M and Mod is in fully understanding the association
of neural object and morphism instances with the corresponding concept models and model-space morphisms,
there is not space here to discuss it in detail. Instead, the present analysis will proceed informally. Nevertheless,
using the mathematical semantic model in this way makes it possible to gain understanding and anticipate neural
structures one might not have discovered otherwise.

6

Applying Category-Theoretic Design Principles

To fully represent the concept hierarchy expressed in the category Concept is a daunting undertaking. First of
all, there is an infinite number of concepts and morphisms in Concept but any realizable neural architecture A
is finite. Therefore, if a neural category NA,w is to represent only that which is possible to construct from A
with any weight array w , any functor Concept −→ NA,w is inherently a many-to-one mapping on both objects
and morphisms. This will be explored further in discussing concept compression in Section 9. An accurate
representation of even a finite number of concepts in their entirety can be intractable. Many concepts are simply
not representable in many architectures, and many are not represented at a given stage of learning using the
current weight array w even though they are representable: The network may not have learned them yet. One of
the main issues in representability is the complexity of the architecture. In the concepts T1 — T5 of the triangle
example, the axiom relating points and lines appears in all the concepts. It is a basic notion in geometry [5] and a
neural network that fully expresses it must therefore possess the ability to reason about geometry, a cognitive skill
apparently possessed only by highly complex systems. The many predicates and functions used in the axioms of
concepts, such as the on predicate of the triangle example, are similarly difficult to represent in an explicit form.
It is, however, possible to overcome the latter difficulty in many cases short of designing a fully cognitive neural
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network as long as the representation is not required to be explicit. The triangle example serves to illustrate this
as we demonstrate in this section.
The main point of this section is that the more one wishes to represent explicitly with a neural network,
the more complex the design task. Our main thrust is to illustrate neural network design to represent certain
concept constructions, with some items in the concepts necessarily represented only implicitly. This is consistent
with the discussion of logical rules and knowledge representation in the Introduction, for knowledge represented
implicitly can guide behavior in the same sense that the knowledge implicit in the design of any machine guides
its operation. The desired end in neural network design is that the knowledge representation be as explicit as
possible and acquired through experience, so that the machine is useful in applications requiring highly complex
computations including adaptability.

6.1

Representing a Colimit with a Feedforward Network

It is instructive to attempt an association of the triangle colimit example with the learning of the triangle concept
by a specific type of neural network. It is easy enough to match the shape of the triangle diagram with a diagram
in a category NA,w if one is not concerned with the other details of representation. A functorial mapping of
the diagram of figures 7 8 from Concept to NA,w requires only that we assume that NA,w has the necessary
objects and morphisms. The difficulties lie in showing that the architecture A has an associated function ΦA
and weight array w that allows a representation of the morphisms in terms of objects (pi , η) , signal paths γ
and prior activation-input pairs (θ, e) , using our previously- introduced notation. But even this is not enough:
it must also be shown that w can be an output of a learning episode represented with ΦA , that is, that for some
triple (w0 , θ, e) , we can obtain (w, ψ) = ΦA (w0 , θ, e) for some ψ . Fortunately, the main use envisioned for
the semantic model is more generally in network analysis and design. The objective is then to show that the
representation and learning of certain kinds of concepts is possible, not to exhibit all the details of individual
concept representations and learning episodes.
The diagram shape illustrated in Figures 7 and 8 can be achieved in a category NA,w representing a feedforward architecture such as the MLP discussed previously. This requires only a simple modification to the
diamond-shaped perceptron diagram of Figure 9. The result, shown in Figure 10 , has a node p1 in Layer n as
before, but now has three nodes p2 , p3 , p4 in Layer n + 1 and a node p5 shown at the apex of the structure.
We intend that p5 serve as the neural colimit object. Retaining our binary model in which nodes are treated as
objects, the pi (i = 1, 5) serve as objects as well as nodes. We intend that p5 serve as the neural colimit object.
We further intend that the connections ck (k = 1, 6) be involved in the signal paths corresponding to the colimit
defining diagram morphisms
m1 : p1 −→ p2 ,
m2 : p1 −→ p3 ,
m3 : p1 −→ p4 ,
m4 : p2 −→ p5 ,
m5 : p3 −→ p5 ,
m6 : p4 −→ p5 .

(8)

Specifically, morphism mk (k = 1, 6) is associated with a signal path set Γk (k = 1, 6) . At least one member of
each path set is a single-connection path, where its connection is indicated in Figure 10. That is,
γk ∈ Γk (k = 1, 6) ,
where
γ1 = [p1 , c1 , p2 ] ,
γ2 = [p1 , c2 , p3 ] ,
γ3 = [p1 , c3 , p4 ] ,

(9)

(10)
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Figure 10: Connection paths corresponding to a commutative diagram intended to serve as a neural colimit
diagram in a feedforward architecture. This diagram is, in turn, intended as the functorial image of the
defining diagram for the triangle concept example.
γ4 = [p2 , c4 , p5 ] ,
γ5 = [p3 , c5 , p5 ] ,
γ6 = [p4 , c6 , p5 ] .
The neural category diagram is suggestive of the following assignments of functor M images for the concept
objects and morphisms from the triangle example (see figures 8, 10 and 11 ):
pµ =
mκ : p1 −→ pκ+1 =
mκ : pκ−2 −→ p5 =

M(Tµ ) (µ = 1, . . . , 5) ;
M(sκ ): M(T1 ) −→ M(Tκ+1 ) (κ = 1, 2, 3) ;
M(`κ−2 ): M(Tκ−2 ) −→ M(T5 ) (κ = 4, 5, 6) .

(11)
(12)
(13)

For the assignments to be a part of a functor, the neural morphisms m1 , m2 , m3 , m4 , m5 , m6 must form a commutative diagram, that is, there must be a neural morphism m7 : p1 −→ p5 such that
m7 = m4 ◦ m1 = m5 ◦ m2 = m6 ◦ m3 .

(14)

m7 = M(`1 ) .

(15)

M(`1 ) = M(`2 ) ◦ M(s1 ) = M(`3 ◦ M(s2 ) = M(`4 ) ◦ M(s3 ) .

(16)

so that defining

yields the desired result,
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Figure 11: The image under the functor M of the objects and morphisms of the defining diagram of the
colimit for the diagram ∆ in Concept , mapped to a commutative diagram in the category NA,w .
This requires that
Γ7 ≡w Γ8
Γ7 =
Γ8 =
Γ9 =

≡w Γ9 , where
Γ1 ; Γ4 ,
Γ2 ; Γ5 ,
Γ3 ; Γ6 .

(17)

It is a trivial matter to establish that a weight array w exists so that the diagram involving m1 , m2 , m3 , m4 ,
m5 , m6 commutes if that is the only requirement. Since the MLP network example relies on binary nodes, let the
node signal functions produce a value φi (θ) = 1 when θ > θT,i , and arbitrarily assign θT,i = 0.5 for each node.
Then, pi is activated when
θi = Σµ∈di wµ δµ > 0.5 ,

(18)

where the values δµ are output signals ξ` emitted by nodes from which pi has input connections. Suppose
that the only input connections targeting nodes p2 , p3 and p4 are c1 , c2 and c3 , respectively; that is, the “other
inputs” indicated in Figure 10 are not present. Then, Γk is a singleton, Γk = {γk } (k = 1, 6) . Assigning weights
w1 = w2 = w3 = 0.6 and w4 = w5 = w6 = 0.2 ensures that p5 is active exactly when p2 , p3 , p4 are active,
which in turn occur exactly when p1 is active. Therefore, the paths γ with p1 = oS (γ) and p5 = oT (γ) are all
equivalent, or Γ7 ≡ Γ8 ≡ Γ9 as desired. (Note that in the earlier discussion associated with Figure 9, we could
have forced commutativity of its diamond-shaped diagram in a similar fashion given the freedom to choose an
appropriate weight array.)
A weight array can easily be found to make the indicated diagram commute, but this is a wholly inadequate
means of ensuring a representation of colimits. First, commutativity is only half the requirement: Initiality is the
other half. More basic to our discussion, however, is that this approach, if followed in neural network design,
would make colimits superflous. Notice that the neural diagram indicated in Figure 10 has all nodes (hence,
signal paths γ1 , γ2 , γ3 ) activated in any instance in which p1 is activated. This precludes the re-use of p1 in
other colimit diagrams when those diagrams are supposed to represent concepts independent of T5 . But one of
the major advantages of the colimit construction is that it allows diagram objects and morphisms to be re-used in
other diagrams, representing distinct concepts, that is, concepts which have different model spaces. The model
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spaces will very likely have nonempty intersections. However, if the concepts that share diagram components are
to be non-redundant, they must have some non-shared models.
Having other connections to the nodes as indicated in Figure 10 allows the flexibility to overcome the redundancy and other shortcomings of the connections and weights discussed here. A balance of inhibitory as well as
excitatory connections allows greater flexibility. Better still, replacing the feedforward architecture with one that
employs feedback connections allows a colimit object node to provide control over its associated diagram. An
example is shown in Figure 12. Utilizing the presence of the “other input” connections, the input connections
to p2 , p3 , p4 from p1 can have weight values smaller in magnitude, hence, weaker, yet p2 , p3 , p4 can be activated individually by appropriate inputs (we shall continue to view all connections as excitatory for simplicity in
this example, although this is not a design suggestion). This allows their associated objects to be used in many
separate but overlapping diagrams defining a wide variety of colimits that happen to share some concepts. The
connections from p2 , p3 , p4 to p5 can, on the other, be strengthened, so that the activation of, say, p2 and p3 ,
is enough to bring about the activation of p5 ; this allows partial evidence for the concept represented by p5 to
highlight it through network activity as a hypothesis for representing the current input. Conversely, suppose that
the feedback connections cR4 , cR5 , cR6 , cR7 in Figure 12 all have weights of sufficient magnitude so that the activation of p5 necessitates the activation of p1 , p2 , p3 , p4 . Then, for example, any instance of path set Γ7 (which is
an instance of both Γ1 and Γ4 , hence, requires that nodes p1 , p2 , p5 be activated) will also be an instance of Γ8
and Γ9 . Thus, the reciprocal connections ensure that the diagram commutes. Having inhibitory interconnections
among colimit object nodes— another type of reciprocity— provides yet another degree of flexibility: it allows
partially-activated nodes to compete for continued activation, with the winners finally suppressing the losers. This
serves as a selection mechanism, allowing the colimits with the greatest support from the current network input
pattern to be selected to represent the input.

6.2

Explicit versus Implicit Representations of Concept Morphisms

In principle, the ability to construct a functor M: Concept −→ NA,w to establish with mathematical certainty the
kinds of information content, or concepts, a neural architecture can represent, or to produce an architecture that
can acquire and represent the kind and complexity of concepts desired. This makes it possible to ground a given
concept representation by exposing its relationship to other concept representations involved in the processing of
inputs by the neural architecture, ultimately relating it to the concepts represented at the input nodes. This raises
the issue of the relative complexity of the morphisms of Concept and NA,w . A concept morphism s: T −→ T 0
can be highly complex, since it is a symbol mapping that shows which items of each type — sort, operation, and
constant— are related in the domain and codomain concepts, preserves the structure of the logical expressions
of T in the substitutions of mapped symbols to obtain their s -images in T 0 and, finally, preserves the truth of
the axioms of T in their images in T 0 . A single connection between nodes cannot be expected to represent this
amount of information explicitly.
Depending upon the complexity of s , an explicit representation of its image M(s): M(T ) −→ M(T 0 ) under a
functor M: Concept −→ NA,w can require a multiplicity of connections and intermediate nodes forming several
signal paths. In the triangle example, M(s1 ): M(T1 ) −→ M(T2 ) would need to represent the various sort, operation
and constant mappings from T1 to T2 . For example, s1 maps point constants p1 and p2 of T1 to pa1 and pa2 of
T2 , respectively. There is another morphism that maps p1 and pa2 and p2 to pa1 , reversing the associations of
points specified in the first morphism. An explicit representation of s1 , in the neural structure defining a morphism
of NA,w must make it clear which of the two is intended. This can be accomplished by having separate paths
γ10 , γ11 , γ12 , . . . with p1 = oS (γ10 ) = oS (γ11 ) = oS (γ12 ) = . . . and p1 = oT (γ10 ) = oT (γ11 ) = oT (γ12 ) = . . . ,
where each path represents one of the associations specified in s . For example, the association p1 7→ pa1 can
be represented using a node p1 0 that is a coproduct object M(T ) + M(T 0 ) for the two neural objects M(T ) and
M(T 0 ) that represent two simple theories T and T 0 sharing the sort Points , with T containing the constant p1
and T 0 containing the constant pa1 (recall that in the neural architecture under discussion, we assume binary
nodes so that nodes = objects). Figure 13 illustrates this. The fact that it is a coproduct object ensures that p1 0
is active only if M(T ) and M(T 0 ) are active (as with the original defining diagram for p5 , where p5 = M(T5 ) ,
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Figure 12: Connection paths corresponding to a commutative diagram intended to serve as a neural colimit
diagram in an architecture having feedback connections. The connections reciprocal to the connection
paths of the colimit leg morphisms implement the model-space morphisms from a colimit concept to the
concepts in its base diagram.
we see that reciprocal connections are highly recommended as a design element). A path γ10 representing the
association of p1 with pa1 is γ10 = [p1 , c10 , p10 , c11 , p2 ] . Here, c10 and c11 are connections whose sole
purpose is to form γ10 : They do not represent concept morphisms—nor can they, since their source and target
nodes represent concepts which are mismatched with regard to the functorial property. Let Γ10 be the path set
defining the morphism M(s1 ) , Γ10 = {γ10 , γ11 , γ12 , . . .} . It is the totality of the path set Γ10 that defines the
morphism M(s1 ) , not any one path within it. None of the paths individually, nor any of their single-connection
components (such as [p1 , c10 , p10 ] or [p10 , c11 , p2 ] for γ10 ), need be the functor image of a concept morphism.
Finally, there are two strategies for ensuring that the truth of the axioms of T1 is maintained in their s1 images in T2 . One strategy is to apply theorem-proving techniques (see [53]). The other is a model-based
approach, checking to ensure that the model-space morphism Mod(s1 ): Mod(T2 ) −→ Mod(T1 ) is properly associated with M(s1 ): M(T1 ) −→ M(T2 ) . Given the earlier discussion of the indexing of models by the instances of
the nodes representing their corresponding concepts, ensuring that the model-space morphism is properly represented can be achieved by ensuring that any instance of the object M(T2 ) that is also an instance of the morphism
M(s1 ): M(T1 ) −→ M(T2 ) is an instance of M(T1 ) .
We have seen that an explicit representation of a concept morphism is a neural morphism with possibly many
paths, constructed in a special way but apparently requiring knowledge of only those concept representations
(such as p10 = M(T ) + M(T 0 ) ) directly involved in defining the associations along its paths. An alternative
to an explicit representation is an implicit representation, with most of the morphism semantics hidden as with
the single-connection path γ1 associated with M(s1 ) in Figure 12. To ensure that this is a valid functorial
representation, however, the mapping of sorts, operations and constants specified by s1 must be discernible by
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identifying the place that the purported M(s1 ) occupies within the network. Fortunately, as mentioned before, a
theorem in category theory guarantees that in the concept category, colimit cocones can be automatically derived
given their base diagrams. This makes it possible to “decode” concept object and morphism representations in
NA,w by tracing connection paths backward to the input nodes where these paths are involved in morphisms of
the defining diagrams of colimits. The functorial property can be applied along with the knowledge of concept
colimit derivations to determine the semantics of objects and morphisms in colimit derivations leading to the
morphism in question. Thus, the connections to be traced are all those in paths leading to nodes M(T1 ) and
M(T2 ) that are involved in the defining diagrams of colimits and/or limits. Although it allows a much simpler
neural representation of the concept morphism s1 as a neural morphism M(s1 ) , it requires examining a potentially
much greater part of the neural network to verify the representation. Ensuring that the truth of the axioms of T
is maintained is the same as with the explicit representation.
Implementing concept colimits as neural colimits places several constraints on neural network design. These
constraints require that nodes be interconnected through multiple pathways to form commutative diagrams and
to provide some degree of accuracy in representing concept morphisms. The ability to enforce colimit representations also suggests that the pathways have reciprocal connections or some equivalent mechanism. There also
seems to be a requirement for inhibitory connections, at least occurring between colimit object nodes, to prevent
a “tower of babel” effect when multiple nodes share large portions of their base diagrams. Finally, representing
concepts of a generally- applicable nature, such as those involving spatially invariant geometric entities, requires
a means of representing the association of a spatially invariant entity with a class of spatially fixed, or locationdependent, entities that it characterizes. In the next section, we address a general notion of invariance, which we
call abstraction. This involves a deeper understanding of the relationship between colimits and limits.

6.3

Grounding the Colimit Representations

The discussion of explicit versus implicit concept morphism representations in the previous sub-section raised
the issue of grounding the representation of a concept morphism by ensuring that a functor actually exists that
confers the semantics of the concept morphism upon a neural morphism purported to serve as its image. This
can be done with either an explicit or an implicit neural representation. The explicit representation demands only
local information about concept and morphism images directly connected with the neural morphism but requires
that these be involved in multiple paths defining a rather complex neural morphism, an example being the path
representing the maplet p1 7→ pa1 . The implicit representation requires analyzing the representations connecting
the domain and codomain images of the concept morphism through many stages of colimit representation going
all the way back to the input node concept representations, but can be implemented as a single connection in
many cases.
More generally, the ability to claim that a functor exists that can be applied to a diagram such as that of
Figures 7 and 8 raises the following issues:
1. There must be input nodes whose activations represent concepts from which T1 , T2 , T3 , T4 can be derived
via appropriate diagrammatic constructions in Concept .
2. It must be shown that the functor extends to these constructions, spanning the network from the input nodes
to p1 , p2 , p3 , p4 .
3. It must be shown that the functor preserves colimits and other needed constructions from Concept ; in
particular, the neural cocone in Figure 11 must be initial: There must be a unique cocone morphism in
NA,w from it to any other cocone for the base diagram M(∆) .
Item 3 is a reflection of the fact that having a functor does not guarantee the preservation of colimits as such.
However, it does preserve the commutativity of all the defining diagrams for cocones, and it also preserves cocone
morphisms. As long as NA,w does not offer additional cocones or cocone morphisms for the functor image M(∆)
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of the base diagram ∆ from Concept , colimits are indeed preserved. A functor that preserves colimits in general
is explicitly referred to as a colimit-preserving functor.
To address the other two items, consider the concept images M(T1 ), M(T2 ), M(T3 ), M(T4 ) . They must be represented directly by input nodes or, more likely, constructed from other concepts associated with neural network
input nodes. The most basic items required are representations of single points and lines. Linked properly to a
visual sensor, for example, the input nodes can be made to respond to stimuli occurring in separate regions of the
image space, such as a retinal visual field or a field of video image pixels (their receptive fields, or RFs). The RFs
can overlap, but each appears to the network as a separate input, since it is associated with a separate input node.
Input nodes having very small RFs, or “blobs”, represent individual points. The detection of a point by a blob
node is signified by a binary 1 (a sufficiently large accumulation of image brightness values occurring in its RF,
yielding a positive stimulus exceeding its threshold). Individual lines can be represented as coproducts, where
their base diagrams are discrete diagrams containing input nodes (remember that nodes are equivalent to objects
in our binary representation). Connections from the input nodes to their line nodes are the paths associated with
the coproduct leg morphisms; note that a point node can participate in many different diagrams, hence, can have
connections projecting to many line nodes.
At this juncture, it might seem that the next step is to form colimits involving the point and line nodes to obtain
M(T1 ), M(T2 ), M(T3 ) and M(T4 ) . However, notice that the concepts T1 , T2 , T3 , T4 all involve the on operation,
and an explicit representation of this using point and line nodes is difficult to envision. Instead, an implicit
representation of on as well as the axiom that uses it to relate points and lines in general will be assumed present
in the manner in which the network is applied to represent geometry. For example, one can observe that a specific
point is “on” a line when the nodes representing both are active simultaneously, generating positive outputs. Also,
.all models of any of the concepts containing the axiom will be assumed to associate a unique line with any pair of
points. In a pebbles-on-a-sidewalk model, for example, any pair d, d 0 of distinct pebbles will appear in the layout
within one line l ; any set of pebbles q containing both d and d 0 that is distinct from l cannot be a line. Another
consideration in constructing M(T1 ), M(T2 ), M(T3 ) and M(T4 ) using point and line nodes as objects is that the
represented points and lines are not spatially invariant—each point is associated with a fixed location in the image
space, and each line is a coproduct of a specific collection of these fixed points. Thus, even if the diagram ∆ could
be represented using these nodes, it would express a triangle with a single, fixed location and orientation in the
image space. Many such triangles would be required to represent arbitrarily-placed triangles. Finally, notice
that the objects and constructions discussed so far leave the network with no means of expressing “pointness”,
“lineness” or “triangle-ness”—that is, all concepts representing fixed points share the property that they represent
points, and similarly for those representing other fixed geometric entities, such as lines and triangles. In other
words, the ability to represent spatially invariant geometric concepts is missing.
This calls forth a more general issue: In order for neural colimits to represent generally-applicable concepts,
their base diagram objects must represent abstractions derived from the specific information represented at the
sensor level. Spatial invariance is one such abstraction; there are many others.

6.4

Designing with Limits: Learning Invariants and Forming Abstractions

The desired representations of spatially-invariant quantities, and abstractions in general, already exist within
the semantic model. It is the capability to derive limits for certain concept diagrams. As with colimits, the
commutative diagrams for these constructions are preserved by functors. For limits, the only caveat remaining is
that the cones must be terminal. As with initiality for colimit cocones, we address this with the general statement
that terminality can be established if the requisite category of cones and cone morphisms can always be found
where the limit of a represented concept diagram exists.
Future reports will explore the construction of limits and their interaction with colimits. For the present,
suffice it to say that spatial invariance for a particular kind of object can be derived via a limit for a discrete
diagram. Indeed, suppose the neural network has developed several representations for the same entitiy—a simple
shape in a visual image space, say, described by a concept T . Suppose that the shape occurs several times in
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input patterns to the network derived from images presented by a visual imaging sensor, and in each occurrence
it appears without the image analysis pre-processing that would be necessary to remove spatial information. That
is, each representation of the shape formed by adapting the neural network weights contains spatial information
fixing the entity at a specific position in the visual field. Each representation is a concept Ti , say, associated with
a neural category object (pi , η) . Each Ti can be thought of as T enriched with sorts, objects, constants and
axioms which themselves constitute a concept Si describing a spatial location relative to a fixed reference in the
space, such as a coordinate center. For example, Ti might be a coproduct, Ti = T + Si . Whether or not Ti is a
coproduct, we express the representation via a functor M as (pi , η) = M(Ti ) .
Consider the discrete diagram consisting solely of a collection of spatially dependent concepts of the form Ti .
A limit for the discrete diagram has an apical object, a concept, that contains only the description that is common
to all the Ti . Since the location-specific descriptions Si vary, this common description is essentially the shape
concept T (some sorts and other information constituting a theory of space may also be present, but this is of
no concern). A neural limit object M(T ) for the discrete diagram of spatially-dependent neural representations
M(Ti ) is a spatially-invariant shape representation.
In the case of the triangle example, the base diagram components are to be spatially invariant. This can
be accomplished by a network that can represent limits as just described. The use of limits and colimits in
combination to form complex representations from spatially-invariant and other abstract representations, as well
as the formation of abstractions by the network, is explored next.

6.5

Feedforward Networks versus Networks with Feedback

Recall that the model-space morphisms Mod(s): Mod(T 0 ) −→ Mod(T ) are directed opposite their corresponding
concept morphisms s: T −→ T 0 and neural morphisms M(s): M(T ) −→ M(T 0 ) . This suggests that a neural
network implementing concepts must have an instance for each concept T (represented by M(T ) ) in every case
that it has an instance for a more complex concept T 0 (represented by M(T 0 ) ) which incorporates it when the
latter instance is accompanied by an instance of a morphism s: T −→ T 0 (represented by M(s): M(T ) −→ M(T 0 ) ).
This must be true independently of whether there is a neural morphism m: M(T 0 ) −→ M(T ) available in the
opposite direction to M(s) to represent the model-space morphism Mod(s): Mod(T 0 ) −→ Mod(T ) . In particular,
this applies to limits and colimits: Every instance of a colimit object T must be accompanied by an instance of
its base diagram, as implied by the model-space morphisms Mod(`i ): Mod(T ) −→ Mod(Ti ) associated with its leg
morphisms `i : Ti −→ T . The concept morphisms are represented in the neural category by the functorial images
M(`i ): M(Ti ) −→ M(T ) , which in turn are represented by bundles of signal paths directed from each M(Ti ) to
M(T ) (recall that if represented implicitly, the leg morphisms can have singleton bundles whose sole elements
are single-connection paths). To begin making the point of this discussion, the simplest means of assuring that the
neural network behaves correctly in accordance with the model-space morphisms Mod(`i ): Mod(T ) −→ Mod(Ti )
is for the neural network to have reciprocal paths directed from M(T ) to each M(Ti ) . Otherwise, the desired
behavior is difficult to ensure: The many diagrams possible in the concept category overlap in many places,
and this makes it highly improbable that a feedforward architecture representing concept morphisms alone and
trained on an arbitrary set of input patterns will perform in the synchronized manner implied by the modelspace morphisms adjoined to colimit leg morphisms. Having a feedforward architecture represent the modelspace morphisms instead of the concept morphisms is no solution to this dilemma, for then complex concept
representations could not be learned as combinations of simple, input feature representations.
On the other hand, an instance of some of the diagram objects and morphisms may provide excitatory input
to the colimit object but without activating it: These objects and morphisms may also be part of another diagram,
and activate instead the colimit of that diagram. An instance of the leg morphisms M(`i ): M(Ti ) −→ M(T ) acts
to “prime” the colimit object, giving it a competitive advantage over colimit objects with lesser or no input from
active diagram representations in the the network. This is where network synchronization is essential: The many,
overlapping network representations of the many, overlapping diagrams that are available to represent a current
input pattern, and thereby retireve its representation from the connectionist memory of the network, must be
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sorted through in some fashion and one or more choices made among them. Intuitively, this can require rather
sophisticated neural circuitry.
By duality, similar comments hold for a limit object for a diagram, but with the directions of all morphisms
reversed. An instance of any of its defining diagram objects in NA,w will activate a limit object for the diagram
as long as there is activity in the signal paths defining the corresponding leg morphism. That is, an output ξi
by an appropriate node pi lying within an appropriate interval ηi , representing a diagram object (pi , ηi ) , will
always activate a limit object (p, η) for the diagram, with an output ξ lying within the interval η being emitted
by the node p , given that the nodes in the network’s representation of the neural morphism representing the
corresponding model-space morphism have activity in their corresponding intervals. That this must be the case
is a consequence of the model-space morphism associated with the leg morphism. The model-space morphisms
Mod(`i ): Mod(Ti ) −→ Mod(T ) , directed opposite their corresponding concept morphisms s: T −→ Ti and neural
morphisms M(s): M(T ) −→ M(Ti ) , are represented in the neural network architecture by connections reciprocal
to the signal path bundles representing the concept morphism images in the neural category. On the other hand,
the limit object provides input to its defining diagram objects but need not activate them.
To summarize, the rules for activation of limits versus activity in their defining diagrams have just the opposite
sense of the rules for activation of colimits versus activity in their defining diagrams. This is appropriate, since
the corresponding limit leg morphisms are directed from limit to diagram object, just the opposite of the sense of
the colimit leg morphisms.
An example of this behavior of neural network representations of limits can be seen in the relationship between spatially invariant representations and the spatially-dependent items they represent. More generally, the
formation in the neural network of a representation of a limit for a diagram is characteristic of the derivation of
an abstraction when a diagram of special cases of the abstract concept is represented by neural network activity.
In the concept category, that which is common to the diagram concepts as they are related by diagram morphisms
is the content of the limit object, provided a limit for the diagram exists. The fact that not all diagrams have
limits is a reflection of the fact that an abstraction may not be derivable in many situations. This confers a value
on diagrams that do lend themselves to limit formation. Appropriately, when it exists, the network’s limit object
representation will be activated when any of its defining diagram object representations is activated. This is a
reflection of the fact that an instance of an abstraction occurs when any of its special cases occurs.
The full range of behaviors with regard to limits and colimits just described can be realized in the most
straightforward manner by a neural network that contains reciprocal connections between nodes associated with
neural objects representing concepts that are connected via morphisms. Suppose, by contrast, that a feedforward neural network is designed to learn invariant representations in the manner of the Neocognitron (originally
proposed in [14]). This architecture expresses invariant representations, of visual shapes, say, by having a layer
of simple (S) cells learn spatially-dependent shapes by virtue of having input connections from visual featurerepresenting cells localized to image regions (for example, edge detectors). The S cells for all spatially-dependent
representations of a single shape supply input to a single cell in a layer of complex (C) cells. The C cells represent all the spatially invariant shapes. In our categorical model, the input connections to a C cell are directed
opposite the direction of concept morphisms, where the S cells represent the spatially- dependent shape descriptions, or concepts, and the C cells represent the corresponding spatially-invariant shape descriptions. The S-to-C
cell connections are, in fact, associated with the model-space morphisms. Notice that, as described in [14], any
one S cell can excite a C cell, as is the case with the nodes associated with our discrete diagram objects and the
corresponding diagram limit (or in the discrete case, product) objects.
Similarly to but opposite the situation with colimits, on the other hand, there are no connections in the reciprocal direction—from C to S cells. But these connections are necessary to represent the limit leg morphisms
`i : T −→ Ti , where Ti is a diagram concept object and T is a limit object for the diagram. These morphisms have
the limit object as domain and the diagram objects as codomains. Since there are no C to S cell connections, there
can be no stimulus transmission in the network associated with the activation of a C cell. But this transmission
would be useful in cases where an explicit manifestation of the spatially invariant representation at all locations
is desirable. For example, it might be desired to call forth a shape representation and have the neural network
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“prime”, or stimulate, all past localized representations for the shape. This would give the shape representation
an advantage over other, competing shapes in all those regions. This would serve as a “ shape filter” for input
patterns, and could be seen as a manifestation of the semnantics of the invariant representation in the neural
network’s behavior. In any case, a feedforward network has connections in only a single direction, in particular,
solely for the directions toward (or efferent to) a C cell from its spatially-dependent counterparts. Therefore, a
feedforward network does not have the flexibility in function reciprocal connections would provide the C cells as
limit objects. More generally, a feedforward neural network does not properly represent limits.
By duality, a similar analysis with opposite activation properties can be made for S cells at higher levels which
might receive inputs from a variety of spatial-invariance C cells, to form complex shape representations using the
simpler spatially-invariant C-cell-based representations as features. This use of S and C cells, by placing them in
alternating layers in a feedforward network, is discussed in [42]. The higher-level S cells correspond to colimit
objects in the categorical model, but the feedforward neural network does not properly represent them as colimit
objects.
In summary, the Neocognitron is an architecture that has important and highly useful properties for representing invariant features and complex, multi-feature objects. The paper of Riesenhuber and Poggio [42] provides an
informative and useful analysis of these properties. The claim made in this section is simply that there is more to
be gained by heeding the consequences of the categorical semantics applied to neural networks.

7
7.1

Naturality: Knowledge Coherence Across a Multi-Region Network
Stages of Learning in a Multi-Region Network

Consider, now, a multi-regional neural network, having several sensors with each sensor providing input to a
region of the network. There can be other regions, such as association regions that unify the processing from two
or more sensors, regions whose main function is for motor control (say, for an autonomous vehicle controlled
by the network), and regions for cognitive functions such as situation assessment and planning. The semantic
model specifies that at any stage of learning there is a system of functors: Each functor maps Concept into a part
of the neural category NA,w that models a subregion of the architecture A at the stage of learning represented
by the weight vector w . We can design an architecture to learn concepts describing those aspects of sensed
items representable by any particular collection of sensors, or concepts which involve many sensors for their full
expression but must be implemented with a limited sensor array for economy reasons.
For example, suppose sensors S1 and S2 are available. Separate functors M1 and M2 can be used to represent
the same state of learning in an architecture, but restricting concept implementations to a single sensor in each
case. Thus, each concept and morphism are represented twice—once for sensor S1 and once for sensor S2 . Each
functor models the concept hierarchy as the category Concept , represented in a separate region of the network
having a specialized function. Since functors can be many-to-one on both objects and morphisms, those parts of
concepts that do not relate to the function of the subregion corresponding to a functor are “compressed out”. This
will be explained in more detail. First, let us ask the overriding question for this multi-regional network semantic
model: How are the functions of the separate regions to be unified? The functions are described by the concepts
of the hierarchy, but this is represented differently in each region. In the current example, how can the two sensors
be exploited to acquire a unified concept representation in the neural network, when each sensor region expresses
only that aspect of the concepts specific to that sensor representation? The answer lies in natural transformations
α1 : M1 −→ M3 and α2 : M2 −→ M3 from M1 and M2 to a third functor M3 , as shown in Figure 14 . This system
of functors and natural transformations works together as follows.
The natural transformations α1 and α2 are represented in NA,w by Neural morphisms separate from those
that represent concept and model-space morphisms: The latter are instead specific to each network region. via
reciprocal connections as usual. A third network region contains the representation of the objects and morphisms
of the image of M3 ;. However, the M3 region has no sensor. Instead, it serves as an association region. The se-
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mantic model makes the association function explicit: Each triple of objects Mi (Tµ ) (i = 1, 2, 3) is connected by
the two individual morphisms α1Tµ : Mi (Tµ ) −→ M3 (Tµ ) (i = 1, 2) . This connects the three functorial images of the
concept Tµ . The defining property of a natural transformation specifies that the network connections that support
the natural transformation morphisms are the appropriate ones to unify the two sensors in the dual-sensor representation of functor M3 . For, consider a Concept morphism sα : Tµ −→ Tν specifying a subconcept relationship.
The functorial images Mi (sα ): Mi (Tµ ) −→ Mi (Tν ) (i = 1, 2, 3) preserve that relationship. By composition with
the appropriate natural transformation components, there are two morphisms available from the sensor- S1 -based
representation M1 (Tµ ) of Tµ to the desired fused, dual-sensor representation M3 (Tν ) of Tν : the compositions
α1Tν ◦ M1 (sα ) and M3 (sα ) ◦ α1Tµ . Each of these morphisms has its associated connection paths. For knowledge
coherence, however, we want the two sets of connection paths to be associated with a single morphism from
M1 (Tµ ) to M3 (Tν ) , that is, α1Tν ◦ M1 (sα ) = M3 (sα ) ◦ α1Tµ . But this is just the defining requirement of the natural
transformation α1 . The same holds for α2 , corresponding to the unification of the sensor S2 region with the
association region.

7.2

Diagrams in a Functor Category

The categorical model, with functors from a category of concepts to a category of neural network components and
natural transformations between these functors, provides a mathematical model for neural structures consistent
with concept-subconcept relationships. Colimits of diagrams show how concepts can be combined, and how a
concept can be re-used many times in forming more complex concepts. Functors map commutative diagrams
to commutative diagrams, capturing this aspect of the colimit structure. Natural transformations express the
fusion of single-mode sensor representations of concepts in the same neural architecture, connecting the different
implementations of the concept hierarchy at all levels and in a consistent fashion. This mathematical model
appears to be compatible with a model of the primate brain proposed by Damasio[11]. In this section, we explore
the multi-regional ramifications of these notions.
Functors can be many-to-one on either or both objects and morphisms; for two objects a and b , for example,
it can be that F(a) = F(b) . Because of its significance in architecture design([21],[22]), we refer to this “merging
of objects and morphisms” as compression.
A natural transformation α : F −→ G between functors F, G : C −→ D consists of D -morphisms αa , one
for each object a of C , such that for each morphism f : a −→ b of C , G( f ) ◦ αa = αb ◦ F( f ) . The square-shaped
commutative diagrams for two natural transformations α1 , α2 : F, G −→ (F + G) evaluated at two objects a and
b and a morphism f : a −→ b are shown in Figure 15 . This figure also illustrates the notion of a coproduct for
two functors F and G . Given categories C and D , there is a category D C whose objects are the functors
F : C −→ D and whose morphisms are the natural transformations, such as α1 , α2 . A coproduct functor F + G
for two functors F, G in D C (provided the required injection morphisms exist) is one that compresses a pair of
objects or of morphisms from C if and only if the pair is compressed by both F and G . The coproduct has the
effect of “pasting together” the corresponding commutative squares of the natural transformation injections as
shown in Figure 15 .
Concept

Functors in the category NA,w
preserve the colimit construction, in part because functors preserve diagram
commutativity. A given functor MA : Concept −→ NA,w , therefore, effectively transports the structure of all
possible knowledge— represented by the concept category—into the categorical architecture representation. The
colimit construction also indicates how concepts are formed through adaptation. Of necessity, MA entails a large
amount of compression; in fact, it represents a single state of learning in a finite network, with all the other
knowledge contained in the infinitely-large concept category hidden by compression. Many such functors are
required to express the concept hierarchy representation in the several network regions at the many stages of
learning.
To see how we apply this in analyzing existing neural network designs, consider some of the ART mapping
networks (for example, as analysed in a rule-base analysis in [20]). These couple separate, unsupervised ART
networks (sometimes with an intermediate “mapping field” subnetwork) to provide supervised ART systems. We
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have shown[21] that each ART network has solely coproduct formation as a means of learning complex concepts
in terms of the simple concepts represented by its input nodes. This stems from the lack of connections within
the input ( F0 ) and matching ( F1 ) layers. The more general colimits required to capture knowledge representation are missing, and limits have no explicit representation at all in these networks. Also, there are no nodes
available for compression of yet more complex (or less complex) concepts, or input concepts not represented by
the present input layer. The effect is to limit the concept hierarchy representation to a functor image fragment
containing at most coproducts over a single layer. Further, the interconnections between ART networks required
for commutative squares are not present, so any natural transformations would be only partially represented[21].
On the positive side, ART networks have important advantages for a study of knowledge representation. The
explicit learning procedure and the presence of feedback (top-down) connections facilitates the identification of
intervals η of the F2 nodes as coproduct objects: The bottom-up connections to a previously-committed F2
node that have nonzero weights are the connection paths of the coproduct injection morphisms. Using an ART 1
network as an example[6], the coproduct objects are the previously-mentioned intervals η2 of the committed F2
nodes. Suppose that the template of a winner-take-all node in the F2 competition to represent an input pattern
is a subset template of “sufficient size” (see [6]; “subset” means that each nonzero template connection weight
corresponds to a nonzero input pattern value, and “sufficient size” means that there are “enough” template nonzeros). The top-down, unit-weight template connections then ensure the activation in their η2 intervals of exactly
the F1 nodes in the discrete diagram upon which the currently-expressed coproduct is based, thus ensuring the
continued activation of the coproduct morphism connections. This largely describes the semantics of resonance
in a typical ART network.
The interconnects between F2 layers of the separate ART networks is suggestive of natural transformation
components corresponding to the concepts represented by the F2 η2 intervals. What is missing are the components corresponding to the concepts at the F0 (or, equivalently, the F1 ) level. We decided to exploit the properties
of network templates and interconnections by using ART networks as a point of departure in developing new
architectures more compatible with knowledge representation and coherence.

8

A Categorically-Motivated Multi-Regional Design

In this section, we apply the design principle of knowledge coherence to derive a neural network design that
improves upon multi-ART networks. We do not address improvements to allow the derivation of colimits more
general than coproducts, and we do not address the derivation of limits. The design principles corresponding to
these fundamentally important considerations will be addressed in future analyses. Further discussion of them
does, however, appear in later sections of this document.
We have given a very brief example of applying the categorical semantic theory using ART mapping networks.
The example emphasized binary nodes for simplicity, using the binary intervals η2 . Our other example, the
proposed categorical neural architecture that is the subject of this paper, will be described next. Although this
initial architecture is designed to operate in a binary fashion, we use the more general notation η for arbitrary
intervals for simplicity and also to emphasize that the semantic model applies to other than binary-node networks.
Figure 14 shows the overall scheme for an architecture that represents and coherently fuses the information
from two sensors according to our theory. There are three regions, two receiving input from sensors and the
third, an association region, receiving input from the other two regions. In terms of the semantic model, the
architecture at a given stage of learning is represented by the category NA,w and the sensor regions are represented
by the images of the functors M1 and M2 . The association region is represented by the image of M3 . Two
natural transformations αi : Mi −→ M3 (i ∈ {1, 2}) are coproduct morphisms for the discrete diagram containing
Concept
M1 , M2 in NA,w
, and M3 is the corresponding coproduct object, M3 = M1 + M2 . Figure 16 shows an initial
architecture designed in accordance with this scheme and using properties of ART networks where these can be
exploited. We call the sensor regions primaries and denote these by P1 and P2 , corresponding to the functors
M1 and M2 . We call the region corresponding to M3 an associator, which we will denote by A . Adaptive
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connections are indicated by arrows ending in bullets and non-adaptive connections have standard arrowheads.
Connection polarity is indicated by + (excitatory), - (inhibitory), or R (a bundle of non-phasic reset connections).
An immediate problem occurs in implementing the scheme of Figure 14 as a multi-sensor architecture. Let
us suppose that the two sensors are logically independent. For example, let P1 be coupled to a visual sensor, with
its F0 layer representing concepts describing visual primitives of some kind, and let the F0 nodes at P2 represent
tactile information provided by an array of pressure sensors. Then, since the two kinds of sensor primitives
convey entirely different kinds of infornmation, each subnetwork must omit the input concepts associated with
the other subnetwork’s sensor. However, our semantic model requires that each functor map the entire knowledge
space of Concept into its subnetwork region, including all of the concepts that describe both kinds of sensor
primitives. To satisfy these competing requirements, there must be NA,w objects and morphisms available to
represent the functorial compression of sensor primitives for each subnetwork within the other subnetwork. We
choose to represent these as a sort of auxiliary F1 node, because it is at F1 that the discrete diagrams form via
bottom-up/top-down matching (ART-based, although the gain control subsystem is not shown). We include one
of these compression nodes in each subnetwork to serve as the target for the functor images of the missing sensor
primitives. They are labelled C1 (for P1 ) and C2 (for P2 ) in Figure 16 . The coproduct functor M3 , on the other
hand, fully represents the non-compressed knowledge represented by M1 and M2 . Therefore, region A has two
F1 layers whose nodes receive inputs from their corresponding F1 nodes in P1 and P2 , respectively. We use the
term “proxies” for the two F1 layers in A ; however, their bottom-up/top-down connections with the A F2 layer
operate independently of P1 and P2 .
We connect each compression node to the proxy of the opposite subnetwork’s F1 layer as shown. There are
pairs of connection paths emanating from the F1 nodes of P1 and P2 to the appropriate A F2 nodes. These form
the commutative squares of the two natural transformations α1 : M1 −→ M3 and α2 : M2 −→ M3 . For example,
let S be an object in Concept that descibes a sensor primitive via the functor M1 , so that for some P1 F1 node
1 and an appropriate interval η , (F 1 , η) = M (S) . To simplify notation, we shall simply use the functorial
F1,k
1
1,k
representation, in the present case M1 (S) . Proceeding, let S be represented in the A subnetwork’s P1 F1 -proxy
layer via the functor M3 as M3 (S) . This yields two F1 representations of S , connected across subnetworks by
a P1 F1 to A F1 connection that represents the natural transformation component α1 (S): M1 (S) −→ M3 (S) .
Let T be a coproduct concept with a coproduct injection morphism m: S −→ T , and let T be represented in
the P1 and A F2 layers by M1 (T ) and M3 (T ) , respectively. Then, there are two connection paths from M1 (S)
to M3 (T ) forming the sides of a commutative square, as follows. One path consists of two connections: a
P1 F1 to P1 F2 connection, the coproduct morphism image M1 (m): M1 (S) −→ M1 (T ) , followed by the P1
F2 to A F2 connection for the α1 component α1 (T ): M1 (T ) −→ M3 (T ) , yielding the composition morphism
α1 (T ) ◦ M1 (m): M1 (S) −→ M3 (T ) . The second path consists of two connections: a P1 F1 to A F1 connection
for the α1 component α1 (S): M1 (S) −→ M3 (S) , followed by an A F1 to A F2 connection, the coproduct morphism image M3 (m): M3 (S) −→ M3 (T ) , yielding the composition morphism M3 (m) ◦ α1 (S): M1 (S) −→ M3 (T ) .
The composition morphisms are the same morphism, α1 (T ) ◦ M1 (m) = M3 (m) ◦ α1 (S) , hence, in the architecture, the two connection paths must represent the same NA,w morphism. In other words, the square whose
sides are the four factors in the two compositions is commutative. Thus, the relationship between the primary
sensor primitive concept representation M1 (S) and the associator colimit concept representation M3 (T ) , where
concept T includes concept S as one of its parts, is independent of the path that expresses the relationship across
the primary P1 and the associator A . This is the basis for knowledge coherence and is one of the theoretical
considerations that help determine the operational rules for the architecture.
Joined to the preceding commutative square is one for the natural transformation α2 : M2 −→ M3 . In the
latter, we obtain two connection paths from M2 (S) to M3 (T ) ; however, there is no P2 F1 node representing
S , but instead the compression node C2 . Defining the appropriate functor images and natural transformation
components as before, but this time using C2 instead of a P2 F1 node (but using again the same A F1 node from
the proxy layer for P1 F1 ), we obtain the commutative square associated with the equality α2 (T ) ◦ M2 (m) =
M3 (m) ◦ α2 (S) . The fact that the two commutative squares are “pasted together” along M3 (m): M3 (S) −→ M3 (T )
implies that in the operational architecture, all four connection paths must become activated for the same inputs.
The details of operation must be defined to be consistent with this.
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Discussion of Operation for the Multi-Region Design

There is not space here to describe the operational flow of the new architecture in full, but we can point out
a few guiding principles. First, the fact that the architecture is to implement coproducts, functors and natural
Concept
transformations and, in particular, coproducts in NA,w
, serves as a basis for the algorithm for the activation
and connection-weight modifications. Thus, the appropriate commutative square diagrams must be activated connecting the P1 and P2 F1 and compression nodes to the currently-active A F2 coproduct node. This operational
consideration is a realization of a theoretical implication of the semantic model: The fusion of information from
multiple sensors is a consequence of knowledge coherence, fully expressed as the calculation of colimits at two
levels. First, colimits in Concept are mapped to their neural representations by functors, which preserve the
commutativity of diagrams. Second, natural transformations representing interconnects to an association region
in a neural network define the latter as a coproduct of functors; in the presented architecture, this results in the
appropriate “pasting together” of the commutative squares some of whose sides are the colimit (in this case,
coproduct) morphism images for the functors.
More operational detail is provided by the desire to stay as close as possible to ART network design. The F2
choice and template modification operations within each subnetwork proceed according to the ART gain control
and connectionist adaptation mechanisms. For example, Neural morphisms such as M1 (m): M1 (S) −→ M1 (T )
and M3 (m): M3 (S) −→ M3 (T ) in the illustration of commutative squares for α1 : M1 −→ M3 are implemented as
bottom-up connections, but the latter are assisted in this role by their corresponding top-down template connections, which ensure their activation during the appropriate periods.
The principle of connections not directly involved in a morphism supporting those that are in their role is
extended throughout the new architecture. For example, the morphism α1 (T ): M1 (T ) −→ M3 (T ) is implemented
as a P1 - F2 -to- A - F2 connection (an on-center (OC) connection in Figure 16 ), but the latter receives support in
that role from its attendant F2 -to- F2 off-surround (OS) connections to the rest of the A F2 layer and also from
a reciprocal connection with which it is paired. Thus, coproduct nodes in Pi and A (i = 1, 2) that represent
the same coproduct concept form mutually-supportive pairs. Sustained activation of a chosen P1 F2 node,
for example, depends upon this, for its support from its own template weakens during the time the input it is
representing is presented to the network.
The P2 -to- A commutative square that shares a side with the previously-described P1 - F1 -to- A - F2 square
has the P2 compression node C2 in the role of the third representation of concept S , M2 (S) , and its connections
to/from the P1 F1 proxy in A are inhibitory. To examine the effect this has in a typical operational scenario, let us
assume that for the current episode of presentation of input patterns to the P1 and P2 F0 layers, P1 was the first
to reach its candidate for its F2 choice, a node representing the functor image M1 (T ) of a concept T . Suppose
that, next, a node representing the image M2 (T 0 ) of a concept T 0 becomes activated. This causes the activation
of C2 (see the appropriate top-down connection in Figure 16 ), which then acts to suppress the P1 F1 proxy layer
in A ; but M1 (T ) has already provided excitation to C1 , which acts in a similar manner to suppress the P2 F1
proxy. Under an ART-like “2/3 Rule” operating in A , the proxies can only sustain their activities if the nodes
representing M3 (T 0 ) and M3 (T ) can provide the top-down excitatory stimulation through the proxy template
connections. However, if M3 (T 0 ) 6= M3 (T ) , then two distinct A F2 nodes will be competing for activation as
winner-take-all nodes. This results in their mutual suppression through the OS inhibitory connections from P1
and P2 , resulting in loss of top-down support to their proxies. The final result is a loss of activity in the node
representing M1 (T ) , for its support from its template has weakened with the passage of time, as mentioned before
(in the current architectural design, M2 (T ) , having reached its choice later, has support from its “fresh” nonzero
template bottom-up connections, hence, remains near full activation). The weakened state of the M1 (T ) node
allows the reset connection from C1 to the P1 F2 layer to have its full effect (C1 , like P2 , lags behind P1 F1
and F2 in its cycle of activation). This results in the stimulation of the F2 competitors for M1 (T ) , which then
compete to choose a new winner. Thus, the functor coproduct is enforced by rejecting the choice of the primary
subnetwork that made the original prediction.
If, on the other hand, M3 (T 0 ) = M3 (T ) , then the primary subnetwork predictions are consistent and the entire
network is said to be in resonance. The proper associations between concept representatives have been established
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and enforced at both the F1 and F2 levels across all three subnetworks. Thus, resonance as here described
corresponds to coherence at both concept levels. That is, a concept representation at F1 in both primaries is related
to a single associator F2 representation through a morphism representation, a bundle of connections representing a
commutative square. The two commutative squares express the notion that the primary-to-associator subconceptto-concept relationships are independent of path, hence, are expressed without ambiguity.
This architecture is currently in preliminary testing for a series of experiments that will follow. Experience
gained with it so far has led to some design refinements. The refinements are not completely determined by
expediency: When a difficulty arises, it leads us to consider the semantic model, and to ask if we are being fully
consistent with it and to what extent does it determine the architectural details.

9

Conclusion

We have presented a mathematical semantic model for neural networks. The semantic model is based upon
category theory, the mathematical theory of structure. The categorical constructs used to model the representation
of concepts and their relationships suggests architectural structures and their properties. These apply to learning
and to the combination of information from multiple sensors in a multi-region architecture. Overall, the analysis
with the semantic model performed to date suggests the following neural network design principles.
1. Functorial mappings guide network design by posing constraints upon the representation of concepts and
their relationships, where the relationships are the morphisms in a category of theories.
2. The learning algorithm of the network must be capable of expanding an existing functor image representation into a larger one through network activation.
3. The expansion of the representation will consist in part of the derivation of colimits to represent complex
entities and situations through the re-use of already-represented concepts and their morphisms. It consists
also of the derivation of limits to represent the abstractions that are derivable from diagrams representing
their special cases. Reciprocal connections are strongly suggested as architectural elements to enforce the
properties of limits and colimits.
4. Natural transformations represent knowledge coherence, the association of information from different regions of a multi-region architecture in such a manner that the separate representations of the concept hierarchy act as one.
5. Reciprocal connections are again suggested, to enforce the commutative squares of the natural transformations.
6. Concept compression is suggested as a means of representing missing information—concepts and morphisms that are represented in one region by a functor but not in another region with its separate functor.
The commutative diagrams of the natural transformations ensure that the missing concepts, compressed
by a many-to-one functor onto a node representing many concepts at once, are properly connected to their
representations in other regions.
We have given examples to illustrate the semantic model and its applications in neural network analysis and
design. We have applied it to achieve an understanding of the semantics of ART networks. We have followed this
with an application to the design of a multi-region, multi-sensor neural network capable of coherent knowledge
representation based upon the new design principles. In the new design, nodes and connections are explicitly
organized to implement coproducts, functors and natural transformations. Experimentation with the new architecture is under way.
There are still details implied by the semantic model that are missing in the new architecture introduced
here. First, as in ART, the colimits represented in each subnetwork are only two-layer coproducts. Limits are
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not represented at all. Second, the compression nodes and morphisms for the infinite variety of concepts not
representable in any of the three subnetworks are missing, with the sole exception of the compression nodes for
the alternate sensor in each sensor subnetwork. Nevertheless, the architecture described here is a beginning at
applying design principles obtained from the semantic model. More generally, the present document introduces
the model and delineates many of its basic features as a guide to neural network semantic analysis. Finally, by
providing a mathematical vehicle for associating a hierarchy of concepts with a multi-regional neural architecture
and explicating the incremental learning of both more abstract and more specific concepts with re-use of existing conceptual knowledge, the model would seem to have a natural role as a fundamental model for exploring
cognition in neural networks.
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Appendix
A

An Introduction to Some Formal Logic Terminology

Quantification of variable symbols is something not normally considered unless one is specifically concerned
with a study of logic, the establishment of truth by argument. An example of the need for quantification occurs
when analyzing statement forms “X is a dog”. Here, the meaning of the term “dog” is clear: It is a symbolic
string representing a class of animals, which can be described in a theory with as much detail as one wishes. In
the description, of course, the theory will resort to undefined quantities: One can include as many definitions and
axioms as one likes in an attempt to describe what exactly is meant by the term “dog”, but eventually one finds
that something in the description must simply be understood without further definition. A theory of geometry,
for example, resorts to introducing “points” without defining them, to avoid circularity in definitions. One cannot
define everything, and at some place in any discussion, formal or informal, there must be an understanding of a
common meaning of terminology with no further explanation required. The symbol “X” in the statement form “X
is a dog”, on the other hand, has no fixed meaning other than that it represents an arbitrary member of the class
“dog”: That is, it is a variable. Clearly, the use of this variable in the statement form leaves the validity of the
statement form ambiguous. No justification exists for stating “X is a dog” without further information about the
context in which “X” is being used. What if X is really a cat or an elephant? It is clear, however, what meaning is
intended in the statement “There exists a dog”. In formal logic, one introduces a variable such as X and restates
this as “There exists an X such that X is a dog”, so that the form “there exists” can be re-use as a general symbolic
form for the statement of existence, with the context of its use supplied by the variable (“X” in this case) and the
statement form to which it is adjoined.
In symbolic logic, or formal logic as it is now called, predicates are used together with logical operators and
quantifiers to form propositions. In the text, propositions are referred to simply as “statements”. A proposition
has a form such as “There exists X such that X is a dog”. A statement form of this kind is called closed because
its variables are all quantified. Axioms, definitions and theorems, the statements making up a theory, must all be
closed.
Predicates are statement forms intended as descriptions of the properties of things. The things are like the
subjects in sentences of natural language, and the predicates are like verb phrases or statements of membership:
In “X is a dog”, X represents an arbitrary subject and “is a dog” is, of course, a statement form for membership
in a class of animal. In formal logic, this would be restated symbolically in a form such as dog(x) . Existentially
quantified, it would be written in a form such as ∃(x)(dog(x)) .
Normally, one needs to supply some qualification for the variables in a proposition. After all, given common
knowledge about life on the planet Earth, it is a bit redundant to assert that there exists a dog. A more useful
statement would declare that some member of a class of thing related somehow to dogs, but defined differently,
is actually, in fact, a dog. For example, one might have the class WA , with some definitions and axioms that
amount to establishing WA as the class of all “working animals”—animals that perform some function guided by
and useful to humans in performing certain tasks (such as police patrol horses, seeing-eye dogs, and so forth). It
might then be useful to have a theory concerning working animals and to include within it (possibly as a theorem,
provable from other statements) ∃(x)(WA(x) and dog(x) . This asserts that some things are working animals and
are also dogs—that is, there are working dogs. Here, two predicates— WA and dog — have been combined using
a logical operator (and) and a quantifier ( ∃ ) to form a statement which is relatively useful and can be evaluated
with respect to its validity. In logic, statement forms and statements (propositions) are all often referred to as
formulae, or more specifically, “well-formed formulae”.
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Constructing Triangles from Point and Line Primitives: An Example
of a Concept Colimit

This exposition presents the details of a concept diagram and a colimit derived from it. Concepts and their morphisms exist either in a category of theories or of theory presentations (formal specifications). The presentation
here is meant to be self-contained. As such, it repeats some of the main text, although only a minor part.
A specific example of concepts, concept morphisms, commutative diagrams and colimits can be seen in
expressing the concept of a triangle as a geometric construct obtained by joining three line segments by pairs.
The example begins with a concept T1 , a very basic theory of points and lines. In this presentation, points are
regarded as undefined quantities and lines are quantities defined in terms of points. This is done through a logical
predicate on that has two arguments, a point and a line, and is true just in case the point is associated with (or
“lies on”) the line. The on predicate is used in an axiom to express the notion that any two distinct points are
“on” some unique line (see [5] for the use of this axiom in several different geometries).
Concept T1
sorts Points, Lines
const p1: Points
const p2: Points
const p3: Points
op on: Points*Lines -> Boolean
Axiom Two-points-define-a-line is
forall(x, y:Points) ((x not= y) implies
(exists l:Lines) (on (x, l) and on (y, l) and
((forall m:lines) (on (x, m) and on (y, m)) implies (m = l) ))
end
The first line contains the declaration Spec T1, announcing a specification for concept T1 . The statement line
sorts Points, Lines introduces the most basic sorts of the concept T1 . Sorts are “logical containers” which
are used to distinguish between the different types of things referred to by the variables or constants in logical
formulas. The things referred to are an example of a specific part of a model for the concept. For example,
the universal quantifier ( forall ) portion of the axiom in T1 , forall(x, y : Points) , makes it clear that the
axiom is a formula applying to all things x and y of type “Points”. As a consequence, the antecedent of the
first implication of the axiom, (x not = y) , is understood to mean that x and y represent two distinct points, as
opposed to lines, circles, widgets, or any other kind of thing. Aside from listing only the axioms of a concept, a
specification lists only the most basic sorts and operations (such as op on: Points*Lines -> Boolean) used
in the axioms. There are also many derived sorts, such as products of the given sorts. If the sorts are represented
by sets in a model of the concept, then the product sorts are represented by the corresponding cartesian products
of the sets. The concept so specified includes all the statement lines one can write that follow as a consequence
of those in the specification, such as all theorems one could prove from the given axioms, and declarations of all
the derived sorts. Derived sorts are any sorts that can be formed by combining the basic ones in sums, products
or other sort constructs (we will require only product sorts in our examples, to provide “containers” for the pairs,
triples or higher-order tuples of things “contained in” the basic sorts). The notion of sorts, together with the
operations associated with them in concepts, is similar to the notion of abstract data types in software program
specifications.
Notice that T1 also states the existence of three labelled, but otherwise unspecified, points p1, p2 and p3 .
This is done through the use of the statement form const X : Points , which is a way of stating that there exists
a specific (but otherwise indefinite) point with the label X . The three constants may or may not represent distinct
points: Their separate nature must either be stated as an axiom of T1 , or provable from other axioms of the
concept. However, there are no axioms in T1 that would apply.
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An equivalent to the use of sorts in sorted theories is the use of one-variable predicates in un-sorted theories. For example, the predicate point (in place of the sort Points ) has the truth value true if its argument
represents a point. Were we using un-sorted theories, the statement lines
const
const
const
point

p1
p2
p3
(p1) and point (p2) and point (p3)

would appear in T1 in place of the lines
sorts
const
const
const

Points, . . .
p1: Points
p2: Points
p3: Points .

The line op on : Points ∗ Lines− > Boolean in the specification of T1 introduces an operation symbol
denoting a function, in this case a predicate which maps an ordered pair (x, l) consisting of a point and a line to
a truth value T or F in the sort Boolean . The meaning of on (x, l) is the statement “point x lies on line l ”.
That is, for specified values of the variables x and l , on (x, l) evaluates to T (true) if x represents a point on l ,
F if not. The sort Boolean is part of a concept of logical operations that is implicitly included in every concept.
Versions of formal logic containing predicates allow for highly expressive formulas, or statements, that employ
functions and quantifiers ( forall and exists correspond to the usual universal and existential quantifiers ∀
and ∃ , respectively).
Theorem-proving software programs use formal specifications such as the one for concept T1 above in applications such as the formal verification of electronic hardware component designs. The use of sorts with an
associated type-checking mechanism is one of many mathematically valid devices that can improve clarity in the
expression of theories as well as efficiency in using them.
We next express three concepts T2 , T3 and T4 by making and modifying three copies of T1 . In each new
concept, we add a line constant, re-name the three point constants (for clarity in this presentation—otherwise, the
specific names are not important), and associate the latter with the line constant via the on predicate. Notice the
additional inclusion of an axiom stating that the three point constants denote distinct points. A specification for
the first of the three concepts, T2 , is as follows:
Concept T2
sorts Points, Lines
const pa1: Points
const pa2: Points
const paext: Points
const la: Lines
op on: Points*Lines --> Boolean
Axiom Two-points-define-a-line is
forall(x, y:Points) ((x not= y) implies
(exists l:Lines) (on (x, l) and on (y, l) and
((forall m:lines) (on (x, m) and on (y, m)) implies (m = l) ))
on (pa1, la) and on (pa2, la) and (pa1 not= pa2)
end
A concept morphism s1 : T1 −→ T2 maps the sort symbols Points and Lines to sort symbols in T2 . Since
we want to leave these symbols unchanged, we map Points to Points and similarly for lines. We also map the
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on predicate symbol to itself, and the same for the variables. However, the point constants have been renamed
in the mapping. All formulas are reformulated with the symbol mapping images to form their images in T2 .
Notice that the axiom relating points and lines maps to itself. Obviously, the resulting mapping of formulas is
truth-preserving: The only truth in question is that of the image of the single axiom of T1 , whch maps to itself
as an axiom of T2 (of course, all truths of the implicit concept of booleans are also unchanged). Finally, we map
the point constants p1, p2 and p3 to the point constants pa1, pa2 and paext , respectively. Here, pa1 and pa2
are associated with the line la via the on predicate and paext is intended as a point “external to” la . This
intention is not stated in T2 because it is not necessary to make it explicit as yet. The individual symbol mapping
relationships are expressed using maplet notation:
Morphism s1 :

Points
Lines
on
p1
p2
p3

7→
7
→
7
→
7
→
7
→
7
→

Points
Lines
on
pa1
pa2
paext

Hereafter, all maplets that leave symbols unchanged will be omitted from morphism descriptions. Since every
sort and operation symbol must map to something, this will not result in any ambiguities.
Concept T3 is the same as T2 except with point constants pb1, pb2 and pbext and line constant lb in
place of pa1, pa2, paext and la , respectively. Similarly, concept T4 is the same as T2 except with constants
pc1, pc2, pcext lc in place of pa1, pa2, paext, la . The axiom of T2 defining la in terms of the two points
pa1, pa2, via the on predicate is replaced in T3 by an axiom with the same syntactic structure, but defining lb
in terms of the two points pb1, pb2, . Similarly, it is replaced in T4 by the axiom defining lc in terms of the two
points pc1, pc2, . The concepts T3 and T4 are:
Concept T3
sorts Points, Lines
const pb1: Points
const pb2: Points
const pbext: Points
const lb: Lines
op on: Points*Lines -> Boolean
Axiom Two-points-define-a-line is
forall(x, y:Points) ((x not= y) implies
(exists l:Lines) (on (x, l) and on (y, l) and
((forall m:lines) (on (x, m) and on (y, m)) implies (m = l) ))
on (pb1, lb) and on (pb2, lb) and (pb1 not= pb2)
end

Concept T4
sorts Points, Lines
const pc1: Points
const pc2: Points
const pcext: Points
const lc: Lines
op on: Points*Lines -> Boolean
Axiom Two-points-define-a-line is
forall(x, y:Points) ((x not= y) implies
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(exists l:Lines) (on (x, l) and on (y, l) and
((forall m:lines) (on (x, m) and on (y, m)) implies (m = l) ))
on (pc1, lc) and on (pc2, lc) and (pc1 not= pc2)
end
We now define morphisms s2 : T1 −→ T3 and s3 : T1 −→ T4 , both the same as s1 but with the following
mappings of point constants in place of those of s1 :
Morphism s2 :

Points
Lines
on
p1
p2
p3

7→
7
→
7
→
7
→
7
→
7
→

Points
Lines
on
pbext
pb1
pb2

Morphism s3 :

Points
Lines
on
p1
p2
p3

7→
7
→
7
→
7
→
7
→
7
→

Points
Lines
on
pc2
pcext
pc1

The objects T1 , T2 , T3 , T4 and morphisms s1 , s2 , s3 form a diagram ∆ . A colimit for ∆ has the requisite
cocone, as shown in Figure 7 , with apical object T5 and leg morphisms `1 : T1 −→ T5 , `2 : T2 −→ T5 , `3 : T3 −→ T5 ,
and `4 : T4 −→ T5 . With ∆ as the base diagram, the defining diagram of the colimit, ∆ as shown in the figure, is
commutative, with
`4 = `2 ◦ s1 = `3 ◦ s2 = `4 ◦ `3 .
(19)
The specification T5 is as follows:
Concept T5
sorts Points, Lines
const p1: Points
const p2: Points
const p3: Points
const la: Lines
const lb: Lines
const lc: Lines
op on: Points*Lines -> Boolean
Axiom Two-points-define-a-line is
forall(x, y:Points) ((x not= y) implies
(exists l:Lines) (on (x, l) and on (y, l) and
((forall m:lines) (on (x, m) and on (y, m)) implies (m = l) ))
on (p1, la) and on (p2, la) and (p1 not= p2)
on (p2, lb) and on (p3, lb) and (p2 not= p3)
on (p3, lc) and on (p1, lc) and (p3 not= p1)
end
Spec T5 is a “blending” or “pasting together” of T2 , T3 and T4 along their common sub-concept T1 . This is
because of the commutativity of the defining diagram ∆ of the colimit. For the equality ( 19) to hold, separate
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symbols of T2 , T3 and T4 that are images of the same symbol of T1 under the three diagram ∆ morphisms s1 , s2
and s3 must merge into a single symbol in the colimit apical concept T5 . To make this clear, we have re-assigned
the name of the common T1 symbol to the merged-image symbol in T5 for each such case. Thus, symbols such
as Points, Lines and on appear in T5 , and appear only once, since they are mapped to themselves by each
of the morphisms s1 , s2 and s3 . The point constants p1, p2, p3 also appear. However, in T5 , each one appears
in the definition of two different lines. This is because each of them appears in concept T1 but is mapped to
three points, one in each concept T2 , T3 , T4 , via the three morphisms from T1 to those concepts. In two of these
concepts, its image point appears in the definition of a line, but as a different point on a different line in each
concept. In the remaining concept, it appears as an “external” point, not on the line named in that concept. For
example, p1 is mapped to pa1 in T2 via s1 , to pbext in T3 via s2 , and to pc2 in T4 via s3 . In T5 , therefore,
it forms the point p1 at the intersections of lines la and lc , and lies external to line lb .
A theorem in category theory can be used to derive an algorithm for calculating colimits in any category
having colimits for all diagrams (the dual to The Limit Theorem—see [39]). The category Concept is one such
category. Thus, the apical object T5 and leg morphisms `1 , `2 , `3 , and `4 in the example can be derived from
the objects and morphisms of the base diagram, ∆ . This confers a great advantage on the use of category theory in knowledge-based system development. Theories and their morphisms (or formal specifications and their
morphisms) can be used to specify the intended semantics of software or other kinds of system components. The
colimit calculation and the structure-preserving mappings of category theory together provide a mathematically
rigorous as well as automated technique for constructing the full system from diagrams[53]. The same kind of
mathematics can be applied to an analysis of neural network representations of knowledge, where the knowledge
is analyzed as a structure of concepts and morphisms acquired incrementally from the network’s input environment. This knowledge structure describes the semantics of the network as a distributed system of interconnected
computational components.
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Figure 13: A connection path representing one of the symbol maplets, p1 7→ pa1 (see text), in an explicit
representation of a concept morphism image M(s1 ) . The intermediate node p10 is shown representing
a coproduct M(T ) + M(T 0 ) of the nodes M(T ) and M(T 0 ) representing concepts T and T 0 that contain
essentially only the point constant symbols p1 and pa1 , respectively. In addition to its injection morphism
i1 to the coproduct object p10 , the neural object M(T ) is also the domain of a morphism with codomain
p1 . Similarly, in addition to being the domain of the injection i2 , M(T 0 ) is also the domain of a morphism
with codomain p2 . The latter morphisms are images of concept morphisms, since the symbols of the simple
concepts T and T 0 are in the concepts T1 (represented by p1 ) and T2 (represented by p2 ), respectively.
However, there is no concept morphism represented solely by the paths containing connections c10 and
c11 . Also, a coproduct was used to describe p10 instead of a more general colimit that would unify the two
copies of the sort Points in M(T ) and M(T 0 ) . This is because to represent the maplet it is sufficient to
associate the path with the symbols p1 and pa1 . The proper unification of concepts is not necessary for
this. The connection cR1 is the reciprocal for the morphism M(s1 ) . It represents the model-space morphism
Mod(s1 ) .
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Figure 14: Functors map the hierarchy of a concept category to multiple regions. Natural transformations
represent coherent interconnections between hierarchy representations.
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Figure 15: A coproduct in D C “pastes together” commutative squares along the morphism images of the
coproduct functor.
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Figure 16: A schematic for NR 1.3, an architecture design based upon three objects (functors) P1 , A and P2 and two morphisms (natural transformations) α1 : P1 −→ A and
α2 : P2 −→ A in the functor category NeuralConcept .

